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Abstract. Conglomerates, multinational corporations and business groups are non-exclusive forms of complex 
firms. Often organized as corporate networks, complex firms control a myriad of firms connected through 
ownership links. We investigate whether parent-subsidiary links within corporate networks enhance 
transparency because the investors in a listed parent company and in its listed subsidiary now receive 
information about these two firms from each these firms. Alternatively, the corporate network complexity 
could bring about more opacity when investors are unable to detect the connections between the corporate 
entities. We examine the share price reactions to information releases by various entities of the corporate 
network. We find that parent’s investors benefit from enhanced transparency in case the parent announces 
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Firms operate in complex environments which is why it may be valuable for investors to scrutinize a firm’s 
disclosure of information to learn more about its suppliers (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), strategic allies (Cao, 
Chordia and Lin, 2016), rivals (Ramnath, 2002), or c -owned firms (Massa and Zaldokas, 2016). Complexity 
may also arise from the firm itself. A form of complexity is induced by a firm’s network based on ownership 
links that often take the form of a pyramid with an apex firm that (in)directly controls (un)listed firms by means 
of majority or minority stakes.2 In this context, information disclosure by one firm within the network can be 
directly relevant for affiliated firms as equity stakes represent channels through which earnings float. In this 
paper, we examine how shareholders respond to information releases by the various entities of the corporate 
network and investigate whether these structures lead to enhanced transparency as investors receive mor  
detailed information coming from different entities, or to more opacity when investors are unable to 
comprehend the connections between the announcing firms.  
Corporate networks, which we define here as a group of legally independent firms connected by 
ownership links and under control of a common owner rep esent a form of firm complexity that has grown 
over time in order to take advantage of investment opportunities, meet diversification needs, or make legal or 
financial constraints less binding. These corporate structures are largely prevalent in Asia (Claessen, Djankov, 
and Lang, 2000), continental Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002), but also exist in the U.S. (see for example 
Holderness (2009) who discredits the myth of diffuse ownership in the U.S.). When corporate networks consist 
of firms located in different countries, operating  different industries, or whose corporate names do not reveal 
any connection, it may even be harder for investors to comprehend that these entities are all part of the same 
corporate network and to process information releasd by the various members of the group. This would be 
especially the case when information is disclosed by group members in which the investors do not hold a direct 
ownership stake. While it may be that group complexity may render investors myopic, the other side of the 
coin is that they benefit from the transparency enhancement brought about by an increase in the overall amount 
of information about the firm. Consequently, smart investors may be able to update their views more frequently 
on the firm they invest in.  
An example of a diversified corporate network is Bouygues SA, a French listed company controlled 
by the brothers Martin and Olivier Bouygues (see Figure 1). Bouygues SA controls the TV channel TF1 SA, 
which is itself publicly listed. The parent Bouygues SA is largely operational in the building sector and controls 
                                                           
2 Whereas Laeven and Levine (2008) define complex ownership structure by the presence of two or more major 
blockholders, our definition of ownership complexity is based on the complexity of the relationship betwe n the corporate 
shareholder (i.e. parent company) and the affiliated company (i.e. subsidiary). 
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the publicly listed company Alstom SA, which in turn controls the Indian firm Alstom India Ltd. and the Thai 
firm Tipco Asphalt Plc. An example of an industry-focused group is British American Tobacco (BAT) Plc., a 
British listed company that is widely held and active in many countries. BAT owns a large number of 
internationally publicly listed companies: e.g. British American Tobacco Del Peru Holdings S.A.A, British 
American Tobacco Kenya Limited, British American Tobacco Zimbabwe Holdings Limited, etc. Although 
BAT is geographically diversified, it may be easier to link the members of this multinational group to the 
parent because of the industrial focus and the common name, than is the case for a diversified group.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
To examine information flows within corporate networks, we identify parent-subsidiary ownership 
structures where both parent and subsidiary are publicly listed and their sets of shareholders only partially 
overlap. Throughout the paper, we will use the term subsidiaries for firms in which a parent owns at least a 
20% stake and are hence presumably consolidated (following IFRS standards). The parent can hold a direct 
stake in the subsidiary or exert control by means of a string of intermediate firms. The subsidiaries r ult from 
partial acquisitions or equity carve-outs/partial IPOs (Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro, 1995). Thus, a parent 
company’s stock can be regarded as a weighted portfoli  of listed and unlisted corporate entities, where the 
weights are determined by ownership stakes in subsidiaries and the subsidiaries’ relative sizes. At least once a 
year, the listed parent and subsidiary companies ar required to make a public and separate announcement of 
their earnings. By studying the market reactions to the release of unanticipated earnings information, we can 
identify whether investors are able to see through the complexity of the group structure or whether corporate 
complexity induces investor myopia. Indeed, the fact that a related listed parent and subsidiary have to a large 
extent a distinct set of investors, and that both firms release separate earnings information - possibly at different 
dates - enables us to examine how the investors of both types of firms react to the information discloure of 
these affiliated firms.  
We distinguish among three cases based on the timing of earnings information release: (i) the parent 
and subsidiary announce on the same day, (ii) the par nt announces first, and (iii) the subsidiary announces 
first. Market efficiency predicts that investors fully and immediately incorporate the earnings surprise 
information unanticipated by the market, the anticipated part of the information (expected or forecast e rnings) 
being already priced.  
When the earnings announcements do not coincide, we conj cture that the first company to announce 
unanticipated information also conveys predictive information about the affiliated company (the second 
announcer) (see Figures 2a-c). Consequently, unanticipated information released by the first announcer should 
not only trigger an immediate share price reaction f r the first announcer but also for the second one. 
Specifically, the first announcer’s surprise earnings announcement is particularly informative when the equity 
stake of the parent in the subsidiary is larger, when the investment from the parent into the subsidiary is direct 
(i.e. in contrast to using several intermediate investment vehicles), and when the subsidiary represents a large 
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part of parent company’s assets. The enhanced transparency conjecture states that investors are expected to 
perceive the ownership links, entailing that the surprise earnings of all announcing companies belonging to the 
network increase the amount of information available to investors. This additional source of information should 
be immediately and fully incorporated in the share prices of all listed firms in the group.  
The alternative conjecture is that investors are unaware of the ownership links and do not react, neither 
immediately nor with delay to the earnings announcements of the affiliated company, and have hence a blind
spot with regard to the corporate network. A variation of this conjecture is that investors are myopic: they are 
aware of the ownership links, but complexity induces d lays in processing information released by affiliated 
companies. We consider the delayed stock price reaction to earnings surprises, measured by the post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD) as an indication of investor myopia (Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990; DellaVigna 
and Pollet 2009; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009).  
[Insert Figures 2a-c about here] 
 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 15,169 ownership link-year observations, corresponding to 2390 
unique (direct or indirect) parent-subsidiary links in 75 countries over the period 2000-2015. First, we find that 
when the parent and the subsidiary release earnings surprises on the same day, investors of both firms strongly 
react to the announcements without delay. However, th se pooled announcements do not enable us to identify 
the information source to which each group of investors reacts. Second, when the parent company releases its 
earnings prior to that of the subsidiary, we find that parent’s investors react both to their own surprise earnings 
announcement and to the subsidiary’s announcement that takes place at a subsequent point in time. This implies 
that the parent’s investors infer that the subsidiary’s announcement contains additional information that was 
not priced yet at the parent’s initial announcement of he aggregated information of the whole group and
supports the enhanced transparency conjecture. In contrast to a parent company’s investors, the subsidiary’s 
investors only react to the subsidiary’s announcement, ignoring the ex-ante and hence predictive information 
released at the parent level. This suggests that the subsidiary’s investors are unaware of the ownership elation 
between subsidiary and parent and fail to see how teir firm is embedded in a corporate network (an extreme 
case of investor myopia). Third, when the subsidiary announces its earnings surprise first, we observe that both 
the subsidiary’s and parent’s investors immediately incorporate this information in the share prices, but do so 
only partially as the share prices keep adjusting in the period after the subsidiary’s announcement to fully 
incorporate the news (reflected in the PEAD).  
We explore three potential explanations of our findings. First, investors may have a blind spot in the 
sense that they do not perceive that companies are intertwined within a complex ownership web. Hence, 
investors do not react to the announcements of an affiliated company as they fail to observe the interal 
structure of the corporate group. The theoretical argument is based on Merton’s (1987) model in which the 
investors are not aware of the entire universe of securities and obtain information on a small number of stocks, 
4 
 
leading to the phenomenon of neglected stocks. In our setting, this would mean that investors do not perceive 
the group as a whole, and mainly consider the firm in which they have invested directly. When the parent 
announces first, Merton’s argument applies to a subsidiary’s investors who react to their own firm 
announcements, but not to the parent’s. A possible explanation for the lack of share price reaction to the 
announcement of earnings surprises could be that a subsidiary may not be that important for the parent and the 
parent’s earnings surprise may be generated by other subsidiaries. Still, the average ownership link of 46% 
and the average subsidiary making up 41% of the parnt’s market value implies that the parent’s investors 
claim on average 19% of the cash flow rights of the subsidiary. Consequently, information released by a parent 
is economically relevant for a subsidiary’s investor , which combined with the lack of or delayed share price 
reaction supports our conjecture about the subsidiary investor unawareness of or myopia towards the 
ownership links (See Figure 2a). 
Second, when the parent announces first, the parent’s i vestors immediately react to this 
announcement and also immediately react when the subsidiary announces an earnings surprise subsequently 
time (see Figure 2a). This result implies that the group structure enhances the quantity of information available 
to the parent’s investors. They initially receive information on the aggregate earnings of the parent company, 
and subsequently - when the subsidiary announces its own earnings - also on the composition of the parnt’s 
aggregate earnings (namely on the degree to which a listed subsidiary contributes to the value creation in the 
group). These findings support the enhanced transparency onjecture.  
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here] 
 
Third, when the subsidiary announces first, we findthat parent’s and subsidiary’s investors are myopic 
or inattentive to the announcements: they react with delay to both earning announcements (see Figure 3b). The 
immediate reaction to their own announcements accounts for 50-66% of the total reaction over the period up 
to 60 days3, whereas the immediate reaction to the other firm’s announcements merely represents 0 to 15% of 
the total reaction. When the subsidiary announces first, not all parent’s investors seem to be aware of the 
ownership or they are inattentive as information processing takes more time. Furthermore, even if theyw re 
aware of the connections, investors may have difficulty interpreting information in a context of network 
complexity, which may also explain the delayed reaction to both their own and the affiliated firm’s earning 
announcements.  
Then, we investigate possible explanations of why parent company’s investors may be more myopic 
and take more time to fully incorporate information nto stock prices. Myopia may be correlated to the degree 
of ownership complexity that may require more sophisticated analysis by investors. Besides, there are sev ral 
reasons why subsidiary’s investors may be more susceptible to myopia. Investors are more likely to obtain a 
                                                           
3 Given that the second announcer’s information can fall within this window, our conclusions are also based on 
uncontaminated windows, as will be discussed below.  
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broad picture of a complex group when they invest in the head of the group rather than in an entity wihin the 
corporate network. When holding equity in the parent, investors seek what drives value, or in other wods, 
which subsidiaries contribute most to value. Furthermore, from the point of view of a listed subsidiary’s outside 
investors, the parent company’s news, even if it isdisclosed first, may be less informative because oth r 
subsidiaries’ performance may blur that of the listed subsidiary. Hence, understanding how the consolidated 
news relates to the individual entities of the group may require sophisticated analysis. Moreover, smaller 
subsidiaries are less liquid because of more concentrat d ownership and the presence of fewer institutional 
investors. If a majority of the shareholders of thesubsidiary are non-sophisticated investors, the reaction to 
announcements, especially for complicated firms, may be understandably delayed.  We find that investors are 
less myopic when a subsidiary is located in the same country and is directly owned. Still, information is not 
more readily incorporated into share prices when th parent and subsidiary share part of a corporate name, and 
when the subsidiary contributes to greater extent to the parent’s value (a higher ownership stake of the parent 
in the subsidiary combined with a larger relative size of the subsidiary). The presence of institutional i vestors 
and of common institutional investors holding equity in both parent and subsidiary does not affect our results.    
We conduct several tests to address endogeneity issues and alternative explanations: First, it could be 
that the decision to announce first or jointly may be endogeneous in that if the management of the parent and/or 
subsidiary anticipate different share price reactions that depend on the timing of the announcement, they may 
try to steer the share price reactions by announcement timing. In the specific case of listed parent-subsidiary 
structures, financial communication calendars may be (de)synchronized depending on the quality or typeof 
the news announcement, i.e. a negative or positive earnings surprise (e.g. Begley and Fischer, 1998; Bagnoli, 
Kross, and Watts, 2002; Doyle and Magilke, 2009). We verify whether the announcement timing is related to 
the type of earning surprise and/or to characteristics of the subsidiary and the parent. We find some evidence 
of strategic timing of the information disclosure by parent and subsidiary, but the results on investor reactions 
and myopia do not depend on the timing of who releases earnings surprise information first and on whether 
the earnings surprise is positive or negative. Therefore, we confirm that our findings are sustained after 
controlling for these issues. 
Second, when the subsidiary announces first, we interpret the delayed market reaction as resulting 
from investor myopia. This finding may not just result from complexity induced by ownership-links but from 
releasing information on days when inattention is usually high. The traditional inattention literature examines 
investor distraction with regard to information timing of stand-alone firms such as the effect of information 
announcements on Friday (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009), busy days (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 2009), and 
busy hours (Michaely, Rubin and Vedrashko, 2014). In all our models, we control for year, month, and day of 
the week fixed-effects. 
Third, absence of or delayed investor reaction that we interpret as investor myopia, may be driven by 
illiquid stocks (i.e. many subsidiaries may have a lower free float given the presence of a major share older, 
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the parent). In all our models, we include a measure of stock illiquidity, which makes it more unlikely that 
illiquidity effects are the main drivers of our findi gs. 
Fourth, while we interpret the absence of a subsidiary’s investor reaction to the surprise earnings 
announcement by the parent who announces first as the result of unawareness of the ownership link, an 
alternative explanation could be that the subsidiary’s investors fear rent extraction from the subsidiary by the 
parent (tunneling) (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; 
Atanasov, Boone and Haushalter, 2010). We conduct several tests on potential tunneling but do not find 
evidence that our findings are affected by expropriation of subsidiary earnings by the parent firm. 
Fifth, a related idea is that internal capital markets may exist that permit corporate groups to allocate 
capital from firms with excess funds to entities that ave profitable projects that they are unable to finance 
with internally generated funds (Maksimovic and Phillips (2013) provide an overview of this literature). We 
find that, when a parent announcing first has negative earnings, its investors react more favorably to the 
subsequently announced positive earnings surprise from the subsidiary, and this effect is amplified when the 
parent’s growth opportunities are larger than the subsidiary’s. These findings suggest that investors may value 
the existence of internal capital markets. These reults hold only in the case of parent announcing first and for 
the parent’s investors, and reconfirms the enhanced transparency conjecture for this case. 
Sixth, we test the robustness of all our findings to any consideration related to the endogeneous 
formation of the corporate networks (e.g. vertical integration, diversification). We include pair parent-
subsidiary industry (country) fixed effects to account for unobserved complementarities and synergies between 
parent companies and subsidiaries operating in different industries (countries), and we confirm these eff cts 
do not affect the way investors react to information released by their company or by the affiliated entity. 
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, we add new evidence on the flow and 
interpretation of information within ‘complicated firms’.4 Cohen and Lou (2012) compare standalone and 
conglomerate firms subject to the same information shock. They find that investors’ limited processing 
capacity leads to a significant delay in impounding formation into share prices of conglomerate firms, 
generating return predictability. Huang (2015) finds that foreign operations’ information of multinational firms 
is only slowly incorporated into stock prices. We document that investors’ processing capacity depends o  
earnings announcement timing by parent or subsidiary and that, overall, the parent’s investors are better at 
processing information than the subsidiary’s. Previous literature has identified settings where within-
conglomerate information sharing can generate value: for instance, Massa and Rehman (2008) find that mutual 
funds operated by financial conglomerates have superior performance, arguably because information is shared 
                                                           
4 Several papers examine valuation issues of complex firms. Slovin and Sushka (1997) analyze valuation effects of 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by publicly traded affiliated subsidiaries. They find negative announcement effects for 
subsidiaries performing SEOs (and positive effects for their parents), whereas a parent’s SEOs reduces parent wealth but 
increases its subsidiary’s wealth, suggesting that a parent-subsidiary organizational structure enhances orporate 
financing flexibility. See also Lamont and Thaler (2003) and Laeven and Levine (2008).  
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by their banking division. Anjos and Fracassi (2015) argue that conglomerate firms have an informationl 
advantage relative to specialized firms, because they have better access to business-relevant information nd 
can therefore generate more value compared to stand-alo e firms. Our setting of ownership networks suggests 
that firms within this network generate information that yields higher transparency that could be beneficial for 
all the investors in the various entities of the group, but is only picked up by some types of investors. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on inattention o information from connected firms (whereby 
connections are based on industry-relatedness, customer-supplier relations and strategic alliances). Ramnath 
(2002) investigates the reaction of investors of non-announcing firms to the earnings reports of the first
announcer (a rival) within an industry. He finds that, despite the fact that the first industry announcement is 
informative for the subsequent announcers, investors underreact to this type of news. Cohen and Frazzini 
(2008) show that stock prices do not fully incorporate news related to a firm’s principal customers. Cao, 
Chordia, and Lin (2016) examine the impact of information released by one partner in a strategic alliance on 
the share price of the other partner. They document a share price underreaction to information release by the 
other partners regardless of whether the information is positive or negative. Barinov, Park and Yildizhan (2016) 
find that the PEAD is stronger for conglomerates than for single-segment firms. Massa and Zaldokas (2016) 
explore how negative credit event information spreads mong unrelated but co-owned firms, which are firms 
without a parent-subsidiary relation, common directors, or customer–supplier relations. They conclude that a 
firm’s value is sensitive to cash flow shocks in and fi ancial conditions of co-owned firms, which provides a 
signal about the monitoring ability of the blockholder. As these papers examine firms related through different 
types of external links but do no analyze corporate elations within ownership networks, our paper tries to fill 
this gap by providing evidence of investor myopia (largely on the part of subsidiary’s investors) and the
benefits of corporate networks such as enhanced transparency (largely on the part of parent’s investors). 
Third, our paper contributes to the business group literature. Firms belonging to corporate networks 
must report their financial information separately, as opposed to segment-level data in the U.S. for instance 
(e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont (1997), and Shin and Stulz (1998). Gopalan et al. (2007) study 
intragroup loans in Indian business groups. Almeida, P rk, Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon (2011) and 
Almeida, Kim and Kim (2015), respectively, try to empirically understand the endogeneous formation of cross-
firm equity investments in Korean Chaebols. While th se studies rely on country-specific samples to observe 
performance and value effects, other papers concentrat  on regional samples in order to compare institutional 
characteristics and explain differences in ownership tructures (Claessens et al. (2000) for Asia; Faccio and 
Lang (2002) for Europe). Beuselinck et al. (2014) analyze earnings management within multinational 
corporations. Finally, Belenzon et al. (2017) study the autonomy of distant subsidiaries from the headqu rters 
in the corporate network. Our findings contribute to the understanding of how investors perceive earnings 
announcements made by companies belonging to a network based on ownership links.  
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Fourth, our paper contributes to the literature on strategic timing of information disclosure. An 
extensive literature has highlighted that managers attempt to strategically time their earnings announcements, 
by announcing bad news on Friday (Penman, 1987, DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009, Michaely, Rubin and 
Vedrashko, 2016), after the market closes (Doyle and Magilke, 2009), by advancing their announcement 
relative to the initial schedule in case of good news and delaying it in case of bad news (Johnson and So, 2017), 
or by changing the advance notice period of the datof earnings announcements in case of bad news (Boulland 
and Dessaint, 2017). These studies examine independnt firms. Within corporate networks, we find some 
evidence of strategic timing of disclosure, but it does not affect investor responses to surprise earnings 
announcements.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the sample selection and 
give descriptive statistics of the main variables. We report our results in Section 3 and the results from a set of 
robustness tests in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Sample Selection 
2.1.  Ownership Links 
We start our data collection by retrieving shareholder information for all (currently and formerly) listed 
companies around the world from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. We find 360,000 ownership links betwe n 
a public company and a public (downstream) company.5 Still, most of these ownership links are participation 
stakes held by financial institutions including insurance companies (45% of all of the above links) or mutual 
funds (25%) and these equity stakes are small with an average (median) of 4.52% (0.56%) of the equity. Some 
of the equity stakes in  Orbis are not given in a numerical format, which is why we decode them following 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015): we replace a percentage with a leading “<”, or “>” by the percentage after the 
symbol plus or minus 0.1%; we eliminate possible sign  that preceded percentages:  “_”, ”?”, or “Â”;  the 
“WO” codes (wholly owned) are replaced by 98.01%; “MO” (majority owned) by 50.01% (because according 
to the international accounting standards practice, majority ownership is at least 50% plus one share and the 
smallest stake reported by BvD is at two decimals, 0.01%); “CQP1” (50% plus 1 share) by 50.01%; “BR” 
(branch) by 50.01%; “JO” (jointly owned) by 50%; “NG” (negligible) by 0.01%; and “n.a” (not available) and 
“-“ (not significant) by zero. 
Our aim is to identify investor reactions to a credible signal emitted by a related company, i.e. a 
subsidiary that directly or indirectly significantly contributes to the parent’s earnings. La Porta et l. (2000) 
define a large owner as a legal entity that directly or indirectly controls at least 10% of the voting ri hts. 
Claessens et al. (2000) use a 20% cutoff to study concentrated ownership structures and claim that with this 
percentage a public firm is likely to be fully controlled by a unique ultimate owner. We follow the literature 
                                                           
5 Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database provides owner and subsidiary links for more than 40 million public and private companies. The 
data are collected from different data sources including the SEC Edgar files for US listed companies, firms’ annual reports, firms’ 
websites, and direct solicitations. Orbis relies on a network of 77 local data providers to collect inter ational ownership data. 
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and retain the ownership links with a percentage equal to or above 20%. Since 2005, there has been a strong 
push for harmonization of accounting standards and principles with the mandatory adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for publicly traded firms, which largely coincides with U.S. GAAP. 
Both U.S. GAAP and IFRS require parent companies to consolidate controlled subsidiaries. IFRS standards 
require the parent to consolidate the entity if there is de facto control, which is interpreted as the parent owning 
a stake of 20% or more (see Appendix B).  
Our 2016 cross-sectional sample of ownership links comprises 14,572 subsidiary-parent relations 
involving 20,616 listed companies. We drop the (4,537) links where ISIN codes are missing. We expand the 
sample going back 16 more years (2000-2015) and obtain a panel of 54,917 link-year observations based on 
ownership links of publicly listed parent companies that6 effectively directly or indirectly control at least 20% 
percentage of the equity of publicly listed subsidiaries.7  
 
2.2. Earnings Surprises 
We collect earnings announcement dates, realized earnings per share, and analysts’ earnings forecasts, 
as provided by the I/B/E/S U.S. and International files. We follow the accounting and finance literatue by 
defining earnings surprises as the difference between the announced earnings and the analysts’ forecasts from 
the period prior to the announcement. Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), we take each analyst’s mo t 
recent forecast prior to the announcement provided that the forecast is not older than 180 days prior to the 
announcement and not more recent than 3 days before the announcement (to avoid recent forecasts being 
affected by leakage of information on realized earnings), thereby limiting the sample to one forecast per
analyst. Our earnings forecast is the median of all analysts’ forecasts. We scale the difference between the 
realized earnings and the median analyst forecast by the share price taken five trading days prior to the 
announcement. Thus, our estimate of the earnings surpri e for firm  on day τ can be written as: 
,τ = (	,τ − 	,τ;τ )price,τ'  
The variable	(	()	*τ+, which is the independent variable of interest, is defined following 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009): 
(	()	*τ+ 	= ,
1, ,τ 	 ∈ 	 {*10;*11}
0, ,τ 	 ∈ {*1;*2}  
The variable ,τ distribution is split into 11 quantiles *, with *6 being the quantile with a ,τ	 
closed to zero, *7;*11  the quantiles with positive ,τ	,  and *1;*5  the quantiles with negative 
,τ. 
                                                           
6 We link the Orbis ownership information to Datastream and I/B/E/S databases using the ISIN identifier. 
7 We correct the data for potential mistakes; e.g. we deleted the link-year observations prior to the IPO year, and after the delisting and 
full takeover year. IPO and delisting dates are collected from BvD Amadeus and Datastream. Takeovers dates are collected from BvD 
Zephyr as it has common identifiers with the Orbis database. We also retrieved all historical ownership links available in the Orbis 
Historical files related to companies involved in the sample of cross sectional links.  
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As we work with a global sample, we convert all quantities to USD by means of daily exchange rates 
from Datastream. We delete the observations with extreme earnings surprises (in absolute value is greater than 
one). We focus on the annual earnings announcement b cause the practice of quarterly earnings 
announcements is not universally mandatory, and companies subject to IFRS around the world are required to 
announce their earnings on an annual basis (Hung, Li, Wang, 2014).8 In an international context, most studies 
find that annual earnings announcement are informative, especially for firms in countries with higher quality 
earnings and with stronger investor protection institutions (DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant, 2007), and after 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. (Bailey, Karoly, and Salva, 2006).  
 
 
2.3.  Investor Reactions 
 
The stock return at an earnings announcement represents the change in a firm’s valuation induced by 
investors’ buying and selling transactions triggered by the difference in earnings relative to expectations. We 
compute cumulative abnormal returns for different windows at the date τ 		of parent’s and subsidiary’s earnings 
announcement for each set of investors - where  = {, },  stands for the parent company and  for the 
subsidiary. We download daily returns from Datastream and denote ,6 as the returns of the share of a company 
 on day . We calculate cumulative abnormal returns, 789:,τ+ 	τ; τ + ( , over a τ; τ + (  window as buy-
and-hold returns: 
 ∏ 	=1 + ,6 	> − 1 − ?@,6A B∏ 	=1 + C,6 	>τ+D6Eτ+ − 1F	τ+D6Eτ+ ,  
where  C,6 is the daily market portfolio return. ?@,6A  are obtained by regressing individual returns on the MSCI 
World 600 index returns for an estimation window −300;−46 . We drop the announcements for which we 
have less than 40 days of stock price data. 
For each pair of parent  and subsidiary  in each year t of the sample period, we study two sets of 
investor reactions at two earnings announcement dates, namely τJ		and τK, yielding a total of four reaction-
announcement observations in a given year.  
Our main test is captured by the following equation: 
														789:,τ+ 	τ; τ + ( = L + ?		(	()	*,τ+ 
																																																	+	Ф	N	OP,τ+ + 	Q	RS	OJ,K,τ+ + J,K + Tτ+ + U,τ+ 
where the vector N	O,τ+ 	 comprises the firm characteristics including the log of market 
capitalization, the log of analyst coverage, the market-to-book ratio, and a dummy equaling one if the company 
has more than 50% of zero-return days in a given year. RS	OJ,K,τ+ is a vector of a pair (, ) 
                                                           
8 As of today, 114 countries have converged to IFRS (see Appendix B for more details). In many countries, the usefulness of 
mandatory reporting of quarterly earnings has been questioned, as they are believed to strengthen a short-term focus at the expense of 
the long run. E.g. the Interim Management Statements, i troduced in 2007 in the UK, were abandoned in 2014. In 2013, the European 
Commission amended its Transparency Directive stating that quarterly financial information is not necessary for investor protection.  
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characteristics including the companies’ relative siz , percentage of common analysts, percentage of control 
held by the parent, a dummy variable indicating a direct ownership relation, and dummy variables equaling 
one if the parent and subsidiary are located in the same country, and have part of their name in common, 
respectively. We also include industry and time (year, month, day-of-the-week) fixed effects (Tτ+), and in some 
specifications link (parent-subsidiary) industry fixed effects or link fixed effects (J,K). The dependent variable 
789:,τ+ is calculated by type of investor (i.e. p or s), each of which is expected to respond to the surprise 
earnings announcements of p or s (at τJ or τK). This gives four combinations: (1) parents’ investor reactions 
to the parent companies’ announcements (789:J,τV), (2) subsidiaries’ investor reactions to subsidiares’ 
announcements (789:K,τW), (3) parents’ investor reactions to subsidiaries’ announcements (789:J,τW), and 
(4) subsidiaries’ investor reactions to parents’ announcements (789:K,τV). 
 
2.4.  Description of the Sample 
Geographic breakdown 
The geographical distribution of parents and subsidiaries spans 75 countries. We partition these 
countries into six categories, in addition to the U.S. and Great Britain. The category ‘Asia’ includes China, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Philippine, India, Singapore, and 
Thailand. The category ‘Europe’ includes Albania, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine.9 The 
‘Americas’ comprises Canada, Latin America, and Caribbean islands. The group Middle East includes Israel, 
Turkey, Lebanon, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. AU/NZ stands for Australia and New Zeeland.  
 About 72% of parent companies and subsidiaries are situated in the same geographic region. Fifty-
five percent of the corporate networks around the world are from Asia. Within the Asian groups, 58% are
Japanese, about 10% are Chinese (including Hong Kon), 13% are Korean, and the remainder is from India 
(6%), Singapore (4%), Thailand (4%), Myanmar (4%) and Indonesia (2%). Western continental Europe stand 
for 16% of all the corporate groups (globally), theU.S. for 11%, the Great Britain for 4% and the rest of the 
world for 14%.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the main explanatory and control variables. Means (medians) 
of various firm characteristics are reported for the subsamples of parents, subsidiaries, and parent/subsidiary 
                                                           
9 By comparaison, Claessens et al. (2000)’ sample includes China, Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar, Singapore, 
Thailand, Philippine, and India. Faccio and Lang (2002)’ focuses on 15 western continental European countries: Austria, Belgium, 




pairs (called links). We provide a complete list of variable definitions in the Appendix A and discuss here only 
the main variables. Subsidiaries are on average followed by eight analysts while parents are followed by almost 
14 analysts, which follows from the fact that parents are larger and more visible. The average (median) s ze of 
the subsidiary represents 41% (12%) of the average (median) parent company.  
Parent company’s stocks are more liquid than the subsidiaries’, which have on average a lower free 
float. The average parent (subsidiary) has 25 (13) institutional investors, which control 16% (11%) of the 
average parent (subsidiary). Institutional investors are identified using BvD Orbis and include mutual f nds, 
pension funds, hedge funds, venture capital and private equity funds, banks and insurance companies that own 
between 0.1% and 20% of the equity.10 Thirty-nine percent of the parents and subsidiaries have at least one 
common institutional investor. On average, they have five common owners. 
The average parent-subsidiary structures are geographically focused (72% of the links are in the same 
country), diversified (58% operate in different industries), and 27% share part of the corporate name. Th  
average ownership stake by the parent in the subsidiary amounts to 48% and the relative market value of the 
subsidiary is 41%, such as the average subsidiary represents 19% (0.48*0.41) of the parent’s value, which is 
economically important enough to expect investors t react to the earnings release of the related company. In 
21% of the parent-subsidiary combinations, both companies report SUEs in the two highest SUE quantiles (out 
of 11 quantiles), and in 19% of the cases, both report SUEs in the lowest two quantiles (not reported).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3. Empirical Results  
In this section, we focus first on parents’ and subsidiaries’ investor reactions to the earnings annoucements 
of their own firms as well as to those of the affiliated companies. We then examine the effect of relativ  
announcement timing on share prices in order to understand when (if at all) information is incorporated into 
stock prices. 
 
3.1. Investor Reactions to Earnings Announcements 
 A parent’s earnings announcement contains all the earnings of its various operations, including those 
of its subsidiaries, such that the parent’s announcement conveys information on the corporate network, relevant 
to both the parent’s and subsidiaries’ investors. Similarly, when a subsidiary announces its earnings first, the 
market receives predictive information about part of a parent’s consolidated future earnings.  
In Table 3, we regress investor reactions on announcements of earnings surprises belonging to the top 
and bottom quantiles of their distribution. The parameter estimate of Surprise Top Two Quantiles measures 
                                                           
10 We exclude governments, corporate, and family owners falling under this condition. 
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the returns to good news (top two quantiles) relative o bad news (bottom two quantiles) and we expect the 
parameter estimate to be positively correlated withthe investor reaction.  
Our empirical setting with two sets of investors and two earnings events per year enables us to study 
the investor reaction to the earnings announcement for four combinations of investor reaction-firm 
announcement. We control for the fact that firms can announce their earnings on the same day or that eit er 
the parent or the subsidiary announces first.  For each combination, we look at the immediate and the delayed 
response to the event day which we label day 0, respectively windows [0;1] and [2;60]. For models that test 
investor reactions to earnings surprises of the company they have invested in, we control for that company’s 
characteristics and industry (SIC-2) fixed effects. For models that test investors reactions to the earnings 
surprise of the affiliated company, we include (i) characteristics of that affiliated company (firm size, analyst 
coverage, market-to-book (Q), and stock illiquidity), (ii) link (parent-subsidiary) control variables (such as the 
parent’s ownership percentage in the subsidiary, the percentage of common analysts, the presence of common 
institutional investors, and the size of subsidiary relative to that of the parent), (iii) link (parent-subsidiary) 
industry fixed effects that account for unobserved h terogeneity not only related to these firms’ own industries 
but also to combination of industries wherein the parent and its subsidiary operate and (iv) time-independent 
characteristics of the links (e.g. dummies for a parent and subsidiary being located in the same country, 
operating in the same industry, or bearing a common name). This specification accounts for the endogeneous 
formation of business groups, driven by unobserved complementarities, synergies, or inadequacies between 
industries.  We include year, month, and day-of-the week fixed effects, in order to rule out the effects of 
business cycles, within-year seasonalities, day-of-the-week inattention (e.g. the Friday effect) (Barber et al., 
2013). Robust standard errors are reported in all regressions. 
Table 3 presents the results of the share price reactions: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns at the 
announcement period [0;1] and the subsequent period [2;60] measuring the post-earnings announcement drift 
(PEAD). We examine whether parent’s and subsidiaries’ investors react differently to the announcement of 
their own firm and the affiliated firm. Columns (1) and (2) report the parent’s investor reaction to the parent’s 
own announcement. We find a strong, immediate positive reaction of 1.38%, and a PEAD not significantly 
different from zero. The parent’s investor reaction t  its subsidiary’s surprise earnings announcements are 
shown in columns (3) and (4): These investors do inc rporate the information released by the subsidiary into 
the share prices, although some of the information is i corporated with delay (at the 10% level, we find a 
PEAD of 0.8%). Columns (5) and (6) reveal that the subsidiary’s investors do react to the subsidiary’s earnings 
announcement and half of the price reaction takes place immediately and the other half up to 60 trading days 
after the announcement. The PEAD is economically and statistically significant and robust to the subsidiary’s 
controls such as firm size and a firm’s stock illiquidity.  
In sum, our results support the fact that parent’s and subsidiary’s investors do not react in the same 
way to information released by the affiliated company; for instance, in contrast to the parent’s investors, 
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subsidiary’s investors do not incorporate information on the affiliated firm into their share prices. This 
violation of the efficient market hypothesis may follow from a lack of investor sophistication (myopia or 
inattention) or alternative explanations that we explore further in the next section where we dig one level 
deeper and distinguish among three event-timing cases. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
3.2. Relative Announcement Timing and Information Incorporation 
We dissect our sample into three timing types, respectively the case where the parent and its subsidiary 
release their earnings on the same day, where the parent company announces first (before the subsidiary), nd 
where the subsidiary announces first. For most parents and subsidiaries (about 84%) within a pair, the financial 
year ends coincide (Table 4). Of these pairs, 16% announce their annual earnings on the same day. For 47%,
the subsidiary’s earnings announcement is scheduled before that of the parent; and for 37%, the subsidiary 
releases its earnings subsequent to the parent. When the subsidiary is the first announcer, the parent an ounces 
on average (median) 13 (7) calendar days afterwards. When the parent is the first announcer, the subsidiary’s 
announcement is scheduled 23 days later (with a median of 14 days).  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
For the cases where parent and subsidiary do not anunce on the same day, we perform four different 
tests: we measure the parents’ and subsidiaries’ investor reactions to the announcements of their own firms, 
and their reactions to the announcements of the affiliated firms. In each setting, we study investor reaction or 
inattention, and estimate immediate and delayed reactions to the earnings surprises.  
 
3.2.1. Parent and subsidiary announce on the same day 
Table 5 reports the average immediate and delayed reactions of parent’s and subsidiary’s investors to 
same-day earnings announcements. Both the parent’s and ubsidiary’s investors instantaneously react to the 
announcement of their respective companies in models (1) and (5). Consistent with market efficiency, the 
reaction is immediate and there is no post-earnings a nouncement drift (Models (3) and (7)). The results remain 
unchanged when we control for firm characteristics such as stock illiquidity, firm size, analyst coverage, and 
industry and time (year, month, day-of-the-week) fixed effects (see Models (2), (4), (6) and (8)). As the stock 
price reactions may also reflect the incorporation of information about the affiliated company given that the 
announcements coincide, we cannot identify whether  stock price reactions are driven by information 
released by the parent or the subsidiary or both. Therefore, we turn to the cases where the parent and the 
subsidiary disclose their earnings at distinct moments in time.  




3.2.2. The parent announces first 
Parent’s investor reactions 
When the parent releases its earnings before the subsidiary, investors could react twice in case the 
second announcement (by the subsidiary) also contains new or previously unpriced information. We find that 
parent’s investors strongly react to their own earnings surprises, with a statistically significant BHAR of almost 
1% on the announcement day (Table 6, Panel A, Model 1) and that there is no delayed stock price reaction 
(Model 3). These results are robust to including firm- ndustry, parent-subsidiary industry, and time (y ar, 
month, day-of-the week) fixed effects.  
As a parent’s earnings reflect the consolidated earnings from its listed and non-listed subsidiaries, the 
stock price reaction at the announcement is expected to fully incorporate all relevant information, whic  is 
why we would expect no reaction by the parent’s investors to the subsidiary’s announcement if this follows 
soon after the parent’s announcement. Still, we show t at parents’ investors do also react to the subsequent 
release of surprise information by the subsidiary (Model (5)). This implies that the uncertainty about what 
drives the earnings surprise at the parent level is partly resolved when the subsidiary discloses earnings 
surprises and that this additional subsidiary information is still valuable to the parent’s investors. Extending 
the controls in Model (6) with firm characteristics, parent-industry fixed effects, and link (parent-sub idiary) 
industry fixed effects yields similar results (0.5% abnormal return). The parent’s investors hence react 
instantaneously to the disclosure of earnings surprises of both the parent and the subsidiary and there is no 
evidence of any delayed reaction for the case where t  parent is the first announcer (Models (7) and (8)).  
News related to complex ownership links may require more effort to process as opposed to news from 
stand-alone firms. Similarly, news from geographically nd operationally diversified firms may also be more 
difficult to collect and analyze. A subsidiary’s earnings surprise announcement sheds light on the breakdown 
of the parent’s performance. The total parent’s investor reaction is about 1.28% (=0.96%+0.32%%; models 
(1) and (5), and similar numbers are obtained in models (2) and (6) which combine to 1.23%). Hence, 75% 
(=0.96%/1.28%) of the total information is processed at the parent’s announcement and 25% at the 
subsidiary’s. These combined returns are close to the parent’s investor reaction when the earnings surprise 
announcements are made by the parent and subsidiary on the same day (1.35%, Model (1) in Table 5). The
results remain qualitatively the same when we control fo  the parent’s and link characteristics, and li k industry 
fixed effects (columns (2) and (6)). 
To sum up, when the parent releases its earnings first, parent’s investors react both to their own firm’s 
earnings announcements and to those of the subsidiary, which implies that the latter announcement still
contains some additional information not yet priced by parent’s investors. This finding supports the enhanced 
transparency conjecture for parent’s investors in that corporate networks provide more information to investors 
than stand-alone firms. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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Subsidiary’s investor reactions 
In panel B of Table 6, we test whether the subsidiary’s investors react to the information released by 
the parent when it discloses prior to its subsidiary. As subsidiary’s earnings are consolidated in the parent’s 
earnings, it would be rational for subsidiary’s investors to immediately incorporate earnings surprise 
information released by the parent into the subsidiary’s stock price. However, we do not find any economically 
or statistically significant subsidiary’s price reaction to the parent’s announcement – neither immediat ly 
(Models (1) and (2)) nor with a delay (Models (3) and (4)). The subsidiary’s investors only react to their own 
firm’s earnings announcements. Then, the response is both immediate (1.5% in Models (5) and (6)), and with
delay (Model (7), even if the last result is not sustained in Model (8)). In contrast to parent’s investors, the 
subsidiary’s investors only react to the subsidiary’s announcement, ignoring the predictive information 
released at the parent level. This lack of stock price reaction implies that the subsidiary’s investor fail to see 
how their firm is embedded in the corporate network. This finding confirms our hypothesis of subsidiary’s 
investor myopia about ownership links. 
So, in the case where the parent announces first, the parent’s investors incorporate information beyond 
that of the parent into the share prices, which implies that the subsidiary’s earnings announcement adds value 
and enhances the transparency about the parent company. The subsidiary’s investors only react to the 
information of the subsidiary itself and seem to be myopic towards predictive surprise news from the parent.  
 
3.2.3. The subsidiary announces first 
We now turn to the case where a subsidiary’s earnings a nouncement is scheduled prior to that of the 
parent. We expect that the subsidiary also conveys predictive information for the parent’s investors. The signal 
would be particularly informative when the subsidiary’s earnings constitute a large part of the parent’s 
consolidated earnings. Thus, we expect the parent’s investors to react twice: First, at the subsidiary’s earnings 
surprise announcement, and then at the parent’s disclosure. We expect the subsidiary’s investors to respond to 
the disclosure of their own firm but not to that of the parent because, in principle, all relevant information for 
the subsidiary’s investors is already released at this first announcement date. 
 
Parent’s investor reactions 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the parent’s investor reaction to the subsidiary’s and parent’s earnings 
surprises when the subsidiaries announce first. At he subsidiary’s announcement, the parent’s stock pri es 
immediately react by on average 0.3% (Model (1)), but most of the information is processed with delay over 
the period [2;60] days as the stock prices then still increase by 2.8% (Models (3) and (4)). When the subsidiary 
has announced first and then the parent discloses a trong positive earnings surprise, the parent’s stock prices 
immediately incorporate this positive news (with 1.2% Models (5) and (6)), but again keep adjusting over the 
subsequent period (Models (7) and (8) exhibit a significantly positive PEAD of 2%). 
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Our findings highlight that when the subsidiary annou ces first, the parent’s investors seem myopic: 
They react with delay to both their own earnings announcements and those of the affiliated company. This
suggests that at least some investors in the parent do ot seem aware of the ownership connection with the 
subsidiary, or are unable to swiftly interpret information related to corporate complexity. We investigate these 
two potential mechanisms in tables 8 and 9. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Subsidiary’s investor reactions 
 Panel B of Table 7 reveals that at a subsidiary’s announcement, its stock price on average immediately 
reacts (by about +2%) to the unexpected positive news (Models (1) and (2)), and keeps adjusting upwards by 
another 3% over the subsequent period (Models (3) and (4)). Most of the information is hence seeping i the 
stock prices with a delay. Models from (5) to (6) show that the subsidiary’s stock price does not immediat ly 
respond to the parent’s surprise earnings announcement (which occurs at a stage subsequent to those of the 
subsidiaries) – there is only a weakly significant PEAD that disappears when controlling for various 
characteristics of the links.  
There are several reasons why unawareness of ownership links may be more severe for a subsidiary 
investor. Whereas a parent investor has indirectly invested in the subsidiary (through the parent) andthe 
subsidiary’s earnings directly contribute to the parent’s results, a subsidiary’s investor – by holding a stake in 
only the subsidiary - has not invested in the parent. Moreover, it is probably easier to have a broad picture of 
a complex group when investing in the head rather tan in a part of the group. Parents release earnings that 
consolidate the earnings of the publicly listed subsidiary and of the privately-owned subsidiaries anddivisions 
for which no public separate earnings announcement is required. Hence, while it may be relatively 
straightforward to incorporate a subsidiary’s information into the share price of the parent, it generally equires 
more sophisticated analysis to do the inverse and interpret the impact of earnings information of the parent 
(which comprises information of the network of connections) for a subsidiary’s share price. Hence, from the 
point of view of a subsidiary’s outside investors, although the parent company’s news is disclosed first and 
contains predictive information about the subsidiary’s earnings, this information may not be easy to disentangle 
from other entities’ performance. Another reason for the absence of subsidiary’s share price response at the 
parent’s earnings announcement may be related to lower liquidity of the subsidiary’s stock because of 
concentrated ownership and a smaller free float, which may coincide with fewer institutional investors. If a 
majority of the shareholders in the subsidiary are non-sophisticated investors, the reaction to announcements, 
especially for complicated firms, may not happen or may be understandably delayed – a point we will revisit 
to in the next section.  
Overall, our results highlight that when a subsidiary nnounces first, the information value seems 
blurred and more difficult to understand, and hence triggers share price reactions with a delay, whereas when 
the parent announces first, the reactions are immediate in these cases: parent’s reaction to parent’s 
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announcement, parent’s reaction to subsidiary’s annou cement, subsidiary’s reaction to subsidiary’s 
announcement. 
 
3.3.  Channels of Investor Myopia 
In this subsection, we focus on parent’s investor reaction to the subsidiary’s announcement when the 
subsidiary releases its earnings first, and we investigate potential reasons why information is incorporated with 
delay.11 We first conjecture that the delayed reaction may be induced by characteristics and the complexity of 
corporate networks. Then, we test whether the delayed reaction depends on the level of investor sophistication.  
 
3.3.1. Corporate complexity 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the immediate and delayed parent’s investor reactions to the subsidiary’s 
announcement when the parent and the subsidiary are located in the same or different countries. We find that 
parent’s investors do not immediately incorporate predictive information released by a subsidiary located in a 
different country; the information is then priced with delay. By contrast, parent’s investors incorporate part of 
the information immediately. Similarly, in Panel B, we find that parent’s investors immediately and 
significantly react to directly owned subsidiaries (while part of the information is also priced later), but when 
the subsidiary is controlled through several layers of intermediate firms, the parent’s investors only react to 
subsidiary’s earnings surprise with delay. So, Panel A and B suggest that the complexity induced by 
geographical diversification and by indirect ownership makes investors more myopic.  
When the parent and subsidiary share part of their corporate names, the link between these firms may 
be easier to identify. Still, Panel C shows that the corporate name does not seem to have an impact in that the 
reaction to the earnings announcement takes place with a delay for both subsamples. In Panel D, we distinguish 
between the cases where the parent controls more or less than 50% of the subsidiary’ equity and between th  
cases whereby the relative size of the subsidiary is higher or lower than the median. Stronger control and a 
larger relative importance of the subsidiary may eliminate possible myopia and trigger immediately price 
reactions to the release of information. However, fo  both sets of subsamples we do not find an immediat  
price reaction, but only a delayed reaction (which is why we show the whole time window of 60 days). The 
difference between the price reactions of the subsamples is not statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
3.3.2. Investor sophistication 
Abnormal returns around earnings announcements are presumably the effect of investors who modify 
their holding positions in reaction to firms’ prospects. Investors are more likely to incorporate thissource of 
                                                           
11 We also test subsidiary’s investor reaction to parent company’s announcement when the parent releases its arnings 
first. We find that the absence of subsidiary’s investor reaction is not influenced by the characteristics of the corporate 
network and the level of subsidiary’s investor sophistication. 
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information when they closely follow the company, and are sophisticated and professional investors. However, 
even institutions can be passive investors that do not closely manage their portfolio (Appel, Gormley, and 
Keim, 2016). We test this conjecture by relating parent’s delayed reaction to the subsidiary’s release of 
predictive information in the context of the presenc  of institutional and common owners. Fifty-eight percent 
of parent companies and 50% of subsidiaries have at l as  one institutional investor. Investors in theparent 
who also invest in the subsidiary hold on average 3.2% in the subsidiary.   
Table 9, columns (1) to (4), compares parent’s investor reaction to the subsidiary’s announcement 
when the parent has at least one institutional investor. The presence of at least one institutional investor triggers 
an immediately price reaction, which is absent when there is no institutional investor. For both subsamples, 
there is a PEAD. In columns (5) and (6), we focus on parents with large institutional ownership with large 
being defined as at least 5% and 10%, respectively. We find that over the period going up to 60 days after the 
announcement, more information is incorporated when institutional investors represent a larger part of he 
company’s capital. Finally, in columns (7) and (8), we compare parent’s price reaction when at least one 
institutional investor of the parent also owns shares in the subsidiary. Indeed, common institutional owners 
may be less myopic about ownership ties, as they at leas  know about the existence of the subsidiary (Merton, 
1987; Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu, 2016; Gilje, Gormley, and Levit, 2017). Still, we find that there is no 
immediately price reaction for either subsample andthat the total abnormal returns (over 60 days) are 
somewhat larger in presence of institutional common investors, although the difference between the abnormal 
returns is not significantly different from zero. The evidence suggests that institutional investors are not quicker 
to price earnings surprise, and may not be more aware of ownership connections between parents and 
subsidiaries. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
4. Robustness Checks 
 
4.1 Endogeneous Strategic Announcement Timing 
 The strategic timing literature posits that managers can exploit investor inattention by scheduling their 
earnings announcements. If the managers of parents and subsidiaries know that the immediate and delayed 
stock price responses will differ based on which of the affiliated companies first announces positive or negative 
surprises, they may set up relative announcement timing strategies and hence coordinate their announcements. 
Managers could schedule the announcement of good-news subsidiaries first, and bad-news-subsidiaries after 
the parent company’s announcement. By means of Heckman sample selection models, we test possible 
strategic timing by examining whether stock price reactions to earnings surprises (stage 2 in the models of 
Table 10) are affected by announcement timing (stage 1). The results shown in columns (1) to (4) are 
robustness tests of parent’s and subsidiary’s investor reactions when their announcements are scheduled on the 
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same or on different days. Columns (5)-(7) show the results of a model which conditions on the subsidiary 
announcing prior to the parent (relative to the inverse case). 
Our findings reveal that the choice to schedule a parent’s and subsidiary’s earnings surprise 
announcements on the same day does not affect the way the parent’s and subsidiary’s investors react to the 
announcements (in columns (2) and (4)): Both instantaneous reactions are significantly positive and the long-
term reactions (not shown) are insignificant as in Table 5. From columns (1) and (3), we learn that earnings 
announcements are more likely to be scheduled on the same day when the subsidiary is relatively large, th  
parent owns a larger stake in its subsidiary, when t  subsidiary is directly controlled by the parent (without 
intermediate investment vehicles), when parent and subsidiary operate in different industries, and when they 
share part of a corporate name.  
While we tested in columns (1) to (4) the simultaneous versus staggered announcement, we now focus 
on robustness of a parent’s immediate and delayed reaction to the subsidiary’s earnings announcement subject 
to the possibly endogeneous choice of scheduling the subsidiary’s announcement first relative to the coi e of 
having the parent announce first. We find that the parent’s investor reaction remains unchanged (relativ  to 
the findings in Table 5) when controlling for the announcement timing.12 In column (5), we report the first 
stage and find that the choice to schedule the subsidiary’s announcement first mainly depends on the link
characteristics. Furthermore, the subsidiary’s annou cement is more likely to be scheduled first when the 
parent’s and subsidiary’s surprise earnings announcements are similar (both are in the two top or two bottom 
quantiles of their surprise earnings distributions).13  
Overall, we fail to find evidence that strategic timing affects the investor reactions to the parent’s and 
subsidiary’s surprise earnings.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
4.2. Tunneling and Parents’ Expropriation Behavior 
We interpret the absence of a subsidiary’s investor reaction to the surprise earnings announcement by 
a parent who announces first, as resulting from investor unawareness of the ownership link. However, an 
alternative explanation could be fear of tunneling. The rationale is the following: the parent announces a 
positive earnings surprise, but even if the subsidiary’s investors are aware of the ownership link andexpect 
that the positive earnings at the level of the parent sult from the subsidiary, they may be still skeptical about 
whether this news is positive for the subsidiary. A positive earnings surprise could for instance reflect that the 
parent is able to extract earnings from the subsidiary by conducting self-dealing transactions at the expense of 
                                                           
12 We do not report the robustness test of subsidiary’s investor reaction to the parent’s announcement since no 
economically and statistically reaction was found - see Table 6 (Panel A) and Table 7 (Panel B). 
13 The benchmark for these variables is that one or both of the surprise earnings announcements are in the middle 
quantiles. Many different robustness tests on these variables (e.g. continuous variables on the surprise earnings of parent 
and subsidiary, positive (negative) surprise earnings of parent and subsidiary, etc.) do not affect the findings in stage 2.  
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the subsidiary’s investors. Therefore, positive earnings surprises at the parent level may result from 
expropriation decisions by the parent, leading to reduced earnings at the level of the subsidiary. Likew se, an 
announcement of negative earnings by the parent may indicate that the parent may be enticed to correct the 
negative earnings by subsequently extracting rents from a well-performing subsidiary. To check whether ou  
results could be due to ‘tunneling’, we include legal variables as instruments for the potential for expropriation 
behavior. We use the Djankov et al. (2008) anti-self-d aling index that measures the legal protection of 
minority investors against self-dealing and expropriation by corporate insiders, and interact the index with the 
Surprise Top Two Quantiles variable. We find that a subsidiary’s investor reaction to the parent’s surprise 
earnings announcements (that are disclosed prior to those of the subsidiary) are statistically and economically 
insignificant.14 We also use an enforcement index (also by Djankov et al. (2008)) that measures the extent to 
which contracts are enforced in a court of law. We re- stimate our models by including the interaction of the 
surprise earnings measure with the public enforcement index and do not find any evidence that our findings 
are due to potential tunneling. 
 
4.3. Internal Capital Markets  
The investor response to surprise earnings announcements may depend on the existence of internal 
capital markets whereby surpluses in one division are used to fund capital needs in other divisions. For 
instance, when a subsidiary announces a positive earnings surprise, this may benefit the entire corporate group 
as the parent could redistribute excess funds to growth-oriented subsidiaries. The parent’s response to the 
positive earnings surprise of the subsidiary could be stronger if the parent’s performance (which was 
announced first) was poor. Conversely, a negative earnings surprise by the subsidiary may reduce the 
effectiveness of the internal capital market as redistribution may be more difficult for the parent. To tackle this 
question, we examine whether investors, observing that their own firm has incurred a negative result (and is a 
first announcer), react differently to the second anouncement (that of the affiliated firm). We include in our 
regressions the variable Parent Neg. Earnings which equals one when the parent released negative ctual 
earnings and zero otherwise and then study the response by parent’s investors to a positive earnings surprise 
disclosed by the subsidiary in a context of growth/value firms (as proxied by Tobin’s Q). 
 Model (1) of Table 11 confirms the positive price reaction by the parent when the subsidiary’s earnings 
surprise is in the top two quantiles of its distribut on, which we have shown in Panel A of Table 6. Model (2) 
reveals that the parent’s investor reaction to the subsidiary’s announcement is much stronger when the par nt 
had announced negative earnings earlier on (at 1%) as captured by the interaction term.  
We further verify whether a parent’s stock price reaction depends on the investment opportunities of 
parent and subsidiary, as proxied by their market-to-book ratios (Q). In model (3), we interact a parent’s 
negative earnings with the subsidiary’s Surprise Top 2 Quantiles dummy and the subsidiary’s Q. We find that 
                                                           
14 Table available on request. 
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this triple interaction is negative such that the eff ct of the interaction term negative earnings-positive surprise 
declines: the positive response of the parent with negative earnings to a positive surprise at the subsidiary level 
is smaller when that subsidiary has high growth opportunities (which may require the subsidiary to invest more 
and such that less funds may be transferred to the parent which may come at the detriment of the parent’s a d 
the other subsidiaries’ immediate investment policies).  
In Model (4), we run a similar regression but now substitute the subsidiary’s Q by the difference 
between the subsidiary’s and parent’s Q (dQ) and examine whether the interaction of the parent’s negative 
earnings with the subsidiary’s positive surprise is affected by the triple interaction term that includes dQ. We 
find similar results in that the positive parent investor response to the subsidiary’s positive surprise when the 
parent has negative earnings is smaller when the subsidiary has high and the parent low growth opportunities 
(high versus low Q). Another robustness test to Model (3) is presented in Model (5) where we substitute he 
subsidiary’s Q by a dummy variable that equals one if the subsidiary’s Q is higher than that of the parent. We 
find similar results.  
These findings suggest that the magnitude of the stock price reaction to a subsidiary’s earnings surprise 
depends on the parent’s earnings and the growth opportunities of the subsidiary relative to those of the parent, 
which in turn suggests that the existence of internal capital markets could affect price responses.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
 4.4. Confounding Events 
 When the subsidiary’s announcement is scheduled first, parents on average release their earnings 13 
calendar days later. The delayed parent’s investor reaction to the subsidiary’s announcement (Table 7, Panel 
A) may not be a post-earnings announcement drift but co ld be caused by the earnings announcement of the 
parent itself, which would misdirect our conclusions about the parent’s investor ability (not) to perceive 
ownership connections (Figure 4). 
 In order to address this issue, we first rerun our tests and include a dummy variable equal to one if the 
parent announces earnings within the 60 trading days after the subsidiary’s announcement, which is the period 
over which we calculated the PEAD. We find that ourresults about the parent’s investor reaction are robust to 
the inclusion of this contamination dummy (Table 12, Model (1)).  
Second, we rerun the same test on different post-announcement windows with subsamples unaffected 
by the subsequent parent’s announcement. For example, Table 12, Model (2) tests the parent’s investor reaction 
to the subsidiary’s announcement over a 10-day window; the delayed investor reaction is therefore calcul ted 
for a period of [2;10] days and the test is performed only on parent-subsidiary annual announcement 
observations where the parent announces at least 10 trading days subsequent to the subsidiary. Models (3), (4), 
and (5) report similar tests for the delayed investor reaction calculated over [2;20], [2;30], and [2;40] windows, 
respectively whereby the parent does not release its earnings within the aforesaid windows. As the sample size 
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significantly declines, we do not restrict the sample to the cases where parent and subsidiary have a common 
financial year, but add the dummy variable Same Financial Year. In addition to the usual control variables 
(parent’s and link characteristics), we estimate th models by including link fixed effects and time (year, 
month, and day-of-the-week) fixed effects.  
We find that parent’s investor reactions to the subsidiary’s announcements remain statistically and 
economically significant when controlling for annoucement contamination. Furthermore, we confirm thata 
subsidiary’s earnings surprise is only gradually priced over time by parent’s investors.  
[Insert Figure 4 and Table 12 about here] 
 
4.5. Investors Reactions in Multinational Corporations 
 About 28% of parents and subsidiaries operate in different countries and may be the product of 
unobservable considerations related for instance to geographic synergies, international diversification needs. 
An ideal specification to account for any kind of endogeneous complementarities of the group structure would 
include link-country x industry fixed effects. However, such specification is not identifiable with our sample 
as we do not have enough variation within parent-subsidiary-country-industry. Our baseline models include 
link industry SIC-2 fixed effects (Tables 6 and 7), and we report in Table 13 the same models with link (parent-
subsidiary) country fixed effects instead.  
For each combination, we look at the immediate and the delayed response to the event. For models 
that test investor reactions to earnings surprises of the company they have invested in, we control for 
company’s characteristics and country fixed effects. For models that test investor reactions to earnings 
surprises of the affiliated company we include company characteristics, link (parent-subsidiary) contrl 
variables and link (parent-subsidiary) country fixed effects. We also include time (year, month, and day-of-the 
week) fixed effects. 
Overall, we find very similar results as reported above. More specifically, parent’s investors react 
immediately and fully to their own earnings announcements (Panel A, models (1)-(2)) as well as to the 
subsidiary’s when the parents disclose first (Panel A, model (3)). As for subsidiary’s investors, they still do 
not incorporate predictive information contained in the parent’s earnings released first (Panel A, models (5)-
(6)), but incorporate all the information at and sub equent to the subsidiary’s announcement (Panel A, models 
(8)-(9)). 
In panel B, we report investor reactions when subsidiary’s earnings are released first. Parent’s 
investors do react immediately at the subsidiary’s announcement, but continue to incorporate information up 
to 60 days after the announcement (Panel B, models (1)-(2)). At the parent’s announcement, the parent’s 
investors immediately and fully incorporate the news into stock price (Panel B, models (3)-(4)). Subsidiary’s 
investors also react to their own announcement, but do not immediately incorporate parent’s news.  





We have examined the impact of ownership complexity in corporate networks on investor reactions 
to corporate news by studying whether the release of unanticipated information on earnings by affiliated firms 
affects the stock prices of those affiliated companies. We label the apex company as the parent that is linked 
to what we call a listed ‘subsidiary’ and the link is based on direct or indirect equity stakes of mini ally 20% 
(which is a minimal threshold for consolidation under IFRS rules). 
When the parent releases its earnings prior to that of the subsidiary, the parent’s investors react both 
to the surprise earnings announcement of their own company and to the subsequent announcement by the 
subsidiary, which implies that the latter announcement still contains additional information not yet priced at 
the parent’s initial announcement. These findings suggest that the network induces an enhanced transparency 
for investors who comprehend the ownership links. In contrast, the subsidiary’s investors only react to the 
subsidiary’s announcement, ignoring the predictive information released at the parent’s level (at an erlier 
stage). This suggests that the subsidiary’s investors may be myopic towards the ownership relation of the 
subsidiary with its parent company. When the subsidiary is the first to announce its (unanticipated) earnings, 
both the subsidiary’s and parent’s investors immediat ly incorporate this information in the share prices, but 
do so only partially as there is a post-earnings annou cement drift which also suggests a myopic framework.  
The explanations are that investors may have a blind spot or are myopic in the sense that they do not 
or at least not clearly observe the internal structure of the corporate group. The myopia is worsened by 
geographical diversification of affiliated firms and by the use of intermediate investment vehicles betwe n 
parent and subsidiary (indirect ownership), but cannot be explained by strategic timing of the disclosure of 
earnings surprises (as the timing of the announcement ay be induced by good or bad news), investor 
inattention induced by a day-of-the-week effect or seasonalities, possible expropriation of a subsidiary’s 
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Appendix A. Variable description  
Variable Description 
Earnings Announcement Characteristics 
Earnings Surprise  Parent’s or Subsidiary’s Earnings Surprise: difference between actual earnings for the current 
year and the median analyst forecast (whereby only those forecasts within a six month period up 
to three days before the earnings announcement are retained), divided by the share price five 
days before the announcement date. Only one forecast per analysts is taken. Source: I/B/E/S 
Detail History file 
Top Two Quantiles Dummy variable equal to one if an e rnings surprise falls within the top two quantiles of its 
distribution, and zero otherwise if an earnings surprise falls within the bottom two quantiles. 
Distributions are split into 11 quantiles. The sixth quantile is the zero-surprise quantile. (See 
section 2.3 for more details). Source: I/B/E/S Detail history file 
Contaminated Window Dummy variable equal to one if a subsidiary (parent) announces within the 60-day window after 
the parent (subsidiary) has made an earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. Source: I/B/E/S 
Detail history file; BvD Orbis 
Same Financial Year Dummy variable equal to one if a parent and its subsidiary close their financial ye r on the same 
date, and zero otherwise. Source: I/B/E/S Detail history file; BvD Orbis 
Same Day Dummy variable equal to one if a parent and its subsidiary announce their earnings on the same 
day, and zero otherwise. Source: I/B/E/S Detail history file; BvD Orbis 
Subsidiary First Dummy variable equal to one if a subsidiary announces its earnings prior to its parent company, 
and zero otherwise. Source: I/B/E/S Detail history file; BvD Orbis 
Announcement Distance Logarithm of the number of calendar days between a parent’s earnings announcement and its 
subsidiary’s. Source: I/B/E/S Detail history file; BvD Orbis 
Announcement Timing Change Dummy variable equal to one if, within a pair parent-subsidiary, there is ach nge in the order of 
announcement between the years t-1 and t, and zero if there is no change (e.g. the subsidiary 
announces first at t-1 and t). 
 Source: I/B/E/S Detail history file; BvD Orbis 
Parent Neg. Earnings Dummy variable equal to one if the parent’s realized earnings are negative, zero otherwise. 
Source: I/B/E/S Detail history file 
Firm Characteristics (Parent or Subsidiary) 
Nr. Analysts  Number of earnings forecasts issued by analysts in the six months preceding the annual earnings 
announcement and up to three days prior to the announcement. Source: I/B/E/S Detail history 
file 
Is Illiquid Dummy variable equal to one if a company’ stock displays more than 50% zero returns days in 
a given year, and zero otherwise. Source: Datastream 
Market Value Logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the previous financial year. Source: Datastream 
Has an Institutional Owner Dummy variable equal to one if at least one institutional owner owns an equity stake (of 
minimally 0.01%) in the company, and zero otherwise. Institutional owners include mutual 
funds, pension funds, hedge funds, private equity fnds, venture capital, banks, and insurance 
companies. Source: BvD Orbis 
Nr. Institutional Owners Number of institutional owners who own a stake of minimally 0.01%. Source: BvD Orbis 
Nr. Institutional Owners >1% Number of institutional owners who own an equity stake of minimally 1% in the company. 
Source: BvD Orbis 
% Institutional Ownership Total ownership percentage owned by institutional investors in the company. Source: BvD Orbis 
Q Market-to-book ratio: market capitalization divided by book value of assets. Source: Datastream 
dQ Difference between the subsidiary’s and the parent’s market-to-book ratios. Source: Datastream 
iQ Dummy variable equal to one if the subsidiary’s market-to-book is strictly greater than that of 
the parent’s, and zero otherwise. Source: Datastream 
Self-dealing Index Country-level index of ex-post control over self-dealing transactions (ranging from zero to one); 
it represents the average of disclosure in periodic filings (e.g., annual reports) and ease of proving 
wrongdoing. Ease of proving wrongdoing is the averag  of five variables as defined in the source 
paper: (1) Disclosure in periodic filings, (2) Rescis ion, (3) Ease of holding someone liable, (4) 
Ease of holding the approving body liable, (5) Access to evidence. Source: Djankov et al. 
(2008)15 
Public Enforcement Index Country-level variable ranging from 0 to 1; one quarter point is added when each of the following 
sanctions is available in response to disclosure and approval requirements as defined in the 
source paper: (1) fines for the approving body; (2) jail sentences for the approving body; (3) 
fines; and (4) jail sentence. Source: Djankov et al. (2008) 
Link (Parent-Subsidiary) Characteristics 




% Ownership Percentage of equity that a parent holds in a subsidiary at the end of the previous year. Source: 
BvD Orbis 
Directly Owned Dummy variable equal to one if a parent holds a direct equity stake – not via intermediate 
subsidiaries - in its subsidiary, and zero otherwise. Source: BvD Orbis 
Has a Common Analyst Dummy variable equal to one if at least one analyst follows both a parent company and its 
subsidiary, and zero otherwise. Source: I/B/E/S Detail history file; BvD Orbis 
Common Name Dummy variable equal to one if the Jaro-Wicler string distance16 between the parent’s and 
subsidiary’s names is higher than 0.75, and zero otherwise. Source: BvD Orbis 
Same Country Dummy variable equal to one if a parent and its subsidiary are located in the same country, and 
zero otherwise. Source: BvD Orbis 
Same Industry Dummy variable equal to one if a parent and its subsidiary operate in the same industry (based 
on the SIC 2 classification), and zero otherwise. Source: BvD Orbis 
Has a Common Owner Dummy variable equal to one if at least one institutional owner owns an equity stake in both a 
parent company and its subsidiary, and zero otherwis . Source: BvD Orbis 
 
N. Common Owners Number of institutional owners by parent-subsidiary link, who own equity stakes in both a 
subsidiary and its parent. Source: BvD Orbis 
% Common Ownership The sum of the ownership stakes in a ubsidiary held by institutional owners that also own equity 
in the parent of that subsidiary. Source: BvD Orbis 
Fixed Effects 
Link Country FE Pair (parent-subsidiary) country fixed effects. 
Link Industry FE Pair (parent-subsidiary) SIC 2-digit ndustry fixed effects. 
Link FE Pair parent-subsidiary fixed effects. 
Industry FE Firm SIC 2-digit industry fixed effects. The aforesaid firm (parent or subsidiary) is the firm of 
the investors studied reaction. 
Year + Month + Day FE Year of announcement fixed effects + Month of announcement fixed effects + Day of the week 
announcement fixed effects. 
 




Appendix B. Consolidation Rules around the World 
Since the end of the 1990s, the two predominant accounting standards are U.S. GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles) and IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) when both standard setters, 
IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) and FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board), 
initiated a convergence project (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). As of 2015, IFRS 10, Consolidated Financial 
Statements, defines consolidation rules in 114 countries (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016b). More generally, 
IFRS rules apply to all or most domestic publicly listed companies in a country. The adoption of the IFRS 
system is a voluntary decision by the legislative and regulatory authorities in individual countries. Neither the 
IFRS Foundation nor the IASB (an independent, private sector, and not-for-profit organization) has the
authority to mandate or supervise adoption.  
Currently, 41 out of 42 European countries require IFRS (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016b). The major 
convergence happened in 2005 when 7,000 European companies in 25 countries (including UK) 
simultaneously switched from national GAAP to IFRS. The same year, Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand 
and South Africa also adopted IFRS. In 2007, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Israel and Korea established timelines to 
adopt IFRS, and in 2009, Japan approved an IFRS road map to permit voluntary adoption of IFRS. Today, 
only 24 countries have still not fully converged to IFRS, although 12 of them (including India and Japan) 
permit IFRS. Thailand and Indonesia are in the process of adopting IFRS, while other countries such as China 
and the US have their national accounting standards.   
IFRS 10 on Consolidated Financial Statements (which replaced the consolidation rules defined in IAS 27)
outlines the presentation of consolidated financial st tements, requiring firms to consolidate the entiti s they 
control. IFRS 10 introduces a new definition of contr l, which requires an investor to consolidate an investee 
when it has all of the following attributes:  
- “Power to direct the activities that significantly affect (the relevant activities that affect) the investee’s 
returns  
- Exposure, or rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee (returns must vary and 
can be positive, negative, or both) 
- The ability to use its power over the investee to affect the amount of the investor’s returns” 
U.S. GAAP is the second most followed accounting standard. U.S. domestic companies whose securities are 
traded in public markets must comply with U.S. GAAP consolidation rules. Foreign companies whose 
securities are traded in the U.S. are permitted to choose between US GAAP or IFRS or their national GAAP. 
Nearly 500 foreign issuers in the U.S. use IFRS.  
Some similarities exist between IFRS and U.S. GAAP related to consolidations. Both IFRS and U.S. GAAP 
use the notion of control to determine whether a repo ting entity should consolidate another entity. However, 
there are differences in the definition of control such as the notion of de facto versus effective control (Ting, 
2012). De facto control exists for instance in situations where a parent company may have control over another 
firm in spite of holding less than a 50% voting interest and lacking legal or contractual rights that would permit 
the parent to control the other firm’s voting power or board. Consequently, de facto control may exist in a 
situation in which a major shareholder holds a stake of less than 50% of the voting rights in another entity 
where the other ownership holdings are dispersed. IFRS require parent companies to consolidate de facto 
controlled subsidiaries, whereas U.S. GAAP recognizes only effective control. U.S. GAAP consolidation rules 
are therefore more restrictive than those of IFRS. 
In a nutshell, both U.S. GAAP and IFRS require parent companies to consolidate subsidiaries (in which they 
own more than 50% of the voting rights). When it comes to associate entities, in which the parent owns between 
20% and 50%, IFRS standards require the parent to consolidate the entity if the company is presumably 
controlled by the parent (‘de facto control’), whereas U.S. GAAP require to consolidate these entities only if 
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the parent demonstrates the exercise of a significat influence (‘effective control’) through voting rights or 
board control. In either case, consolidated financil statements use the equity method.  
As almost half of our sample consists of Asian parent companies, we discuss hereafter the consolidation rules 
for Asian countries where business groups most frequently occur (Korean Chaebols, Japanese Keiretsus, and 
Indian conglomerates).  
Korea: All companies listed on the Korea Exchange are currently required to apply IFRS. In addition, IFRS is 
also required for financial institutions with publicly traded securities and state-owned companies.  
Japan: Japanese GAAP was developed by the Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) and resulted from 
an agreement between the ASBJ and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) aiming to make 
Japanese accounting standards converge to IFRS (Tokyo Agreement, 2007). The Japanese GAAP is not 
identical but largely equivalent to IFRS. Since 2010, Japanese companies have the choice between Japanese 
GAAP, IFRS, or US GAAP when issuing consolidated financial statements. As of January 2015, 62 of the 
largest firms companies (with over US$650 billion of market capitalization on the Tokyo Stock Exchange) ar  
using IFRS. 
India (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016a): Consolidation in India is defined by the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI), which requires all listed companies with subsidiaries to file consolidated financi l 
statements to the stock exchanges. The SEBI requires those financial statements to be prepared in conformity 
with the Accounting Standards developed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) and 
approved by the Central Government. However, the SEBI has given the option to listed entities to prepar  nd 
file consolidated financial statements in conformity with IFRS.  
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Corporate Network of Bouygues SA 
This corporate network is designed as a directed graph where nodes represent entities (firms) of the group and the links 
stand for their ownership connections (Glattfelder and Battiston, 2009). We retain only those entities controlled by an 
ultimate owner holding an ownership percentage of mini ally 20%. Following the data provider’s (i.e. BvD Orbis) 
definitions, ultimate owners are individuals, states, or widely-held companies (in which no one owns a ownership stake 
of more than 20%). The graph includes both publicly sted and privately owned entities that are either directly owned by 
a public company, or privately owned companies that are part of the shortest path between two publicly listed entities of 
the group. Publicly listed (privately owned) firms are represented as large (small) points in the graph. The darkest large 
point is the group’s parent company,17 the lighter large points are entities in which thegroup’s head firm owns a direct 
stake, and the lightest large points are firms indirectly owned by the group’s head company. The ultima e owner of this 
corporate network is the brothers Martin and Olivier Bouygues. The group’s parent, Bouygues SA, is located in France 
and mainly operates in the telecom and the construction industries. It controls 537 entities including six publicly listed 
entities: Colas SA (France) which operates in the construction industry, TF1 SA that is the first French TV channel, Aram 
Resources Ltd located in Great Britain, and Alstom SA (France) which is an energy provider acquired in 2015. Alstom 




                                                          
17 The head of the group can sometimes be different fom the ultimate owner, which can e.g. be a family/individual. In 





Expected Investor Reactions when Parent and Subsidiary Announce on the Same Day 
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Table 1. Geographic Breakdown of Corporate Networks around the World 
 
The table reports the geographic dissection of the par nt and subsidiary links. Pairs of publicly listed companies and 
subsidiaries are identified by means of ownership links in Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database for the period 2000 until 
2016. The category Europe includes Albania, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Asia comprises China, Hong-Kong, Korea, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippine, Pakistan, and Taiwan. The Americas include Canada, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean islands. The group Middle East includes Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Oman, and Saudi. 





US GB Europe Asia Africa Americas Middle East AU/NZ Total 
US 178 2 10 4 0 10 0 0 204 
GB 17 16 5 4 4 7 1 1 55 
Europe 15 9 256 12 0 9 3 0 304 
Asia 15 19 41 1,189 1 23 2 3 1,293 
Africa 5 21 21 1 40 0 1 0 89 
Americas 24 10 32 52 3 125 1 3 250 
Middle East 2 1 11 3 0 0 62 0 79 
AU/NZ 1 2 5 7 3 3 1 23 45 





Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table reports the distributional characteristics of parents and subsidiaries, and parent-subsidiary links. The sample of 
link-year observations includes links for which we could match earnings announcements of the parent and the subsidiary 
in a given year. Earnings announcements dates come fr  I/B/E/S and cover the period from January 2000 until December 
2015. All numbers are in USD. Detailed variable descriptions and the data sources are offered in Appendix A. 
  N. Year-Obs. Mean Median Sd P25 P75 
Parent Companies' Characteristics       
  Market Value (USD 000,000) 7,376 11.077 3.619 16.935 1.025 12.294 
  Total Asset (USD 000,000) 7,376 26.421 7.516 44.576 2.138 26.479 
  Tobin's Q 7,376 0.738 0.480 0.868 0.266 0.875 
  Is Illiquidity (%) 7,376 3.39 0 18.10 0 0 
  Nr. Analysts 7,376 13.628 12 10.548 5 200 
  Has an Institutional Owner (%) 7,376 57.71 100 49.40 0 100 
  Nr. Institutional Owners 7,376 25.542 7 36.501 0 40 
  Nr. Institutional Owners >1% 7,376 5.194 2 7.213 0 8 
  % Institutional Ownership 7,376 15.53 0.37 21.60 0 26.41 
  Earnings Surprise 7,376 -0.004 0.000 0.072 -0.005 0.005 
Subsidiaries' Characteristics       
  Market Value (USD 000) 14,110 3.100 0.650 7.692 0.179 2.310 
  Total Asset (USD 000) 14,110 6.393 1.013 20.403 0.322 3.561 
  Tobin's Q 14,110 0.946 0.570 1.186 0.302 1.087 
  Is Illiquidity (%) 14,110 5.59 0 22.98 0 0 
  Nr.  Analysts 14,110 7.853 5 8.322 2 11 
  Has an Institutional Owner (%) 14,110 50.41 100 50 0 100 
  Nr. Institutional Owners 14,110 13.111 1 22.956 0 18 
  Nr. Institutional Owners >1%  14,110 3.232 0 5.800 0 4 
  % Institutional Ownership 14,110 10.59 0 16.98 0 16.28 
  Earnings Surprise 14,110 -0.006 0.000 0.081 -0.007 0.005 
Links' Characteristics       
  Relative Market Value  14,851 0.412 0.123 0.704 0.033 0.448 
  dQ = (sub's Q - parent's Q) 14,851 0.326 0.116 1.160 -0.115 0.517 
  iQ = (dummy: sub's Q < parent's Q) 14,851 0.631 1 0.482 0 1 
  Directly Owned  (%) 14,851 71.92 100 44.94 0 100 
  % Ownership 14,851 48.28 45.54 22.42 29.90 60.40 
  Has a Common Analyst  (%) 14,851 9.33 0 29.08 0 0 
  Named After  (%) 14,851 27.05 0 44.42 0 100 
  Same Industry  (%) 14,851 42.05 0 49.37 0 100 
  Same Country  (%) 14,851 71.88 100 44.96 0 100 
  Has a Common Owner (%) 14,851 39.09 0 48.80 0 100 
  Nr. Common Owners 14,851 4.68 0 10.45 0 4 
  % Common Ownership 14,812 4.65 0 10.87 0 3.77 





Table 3. Immediate and Delayed Reactions by Parent’s and Subsidiary’s Investors 
The table presents results on investor reactions to earnings surprises (within the top two quantiles of the distribution). 
Buy-and-hold-abnormal returns (BHARs) are calculated using the market model over the trading day period (−300,−46 
days) and are measured over the (0,+1) and (+2,+60) event windows. Columns (1-4) report results of parent investor 
reactions to the parent’s announcement (1-2) and to subsidiary’s announcement (3-4). Columns (5-8) repo t results of 
subsidiaries’ investor reactions to the subsidiary’s announcement (5-6), and to its parent’s announcement (7-8). Parent 
controls include the parent’s market value, the log of analyst coverage, the Tobin’s Q, and a dummy variable equal to one 
if the firm’s shares are liquid. Subsidiary’s controls are the same as those of the parent (but applied to the subsidiary). 
Link controls are the companies’ relative market value, percentage of common analysts, percentage of control held by the 
parent, a direct ownership dummy, dummy variables equal to one if parent and subsidiary are located in the same country, 
if they share part of the corporate name, and if the parent and its subsidiary have a common institutional investor. All 
specifications include link (parent-subsidiary) SIC2 industry fixed effects, and time fixed effects (year, month, and day-
of-the-week). Robust t -statistics are reported betwe n brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
[Table continued on next page]  
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Table 3.    Immediate and Delayed Reactions by Parent’s and Subsidiary’s Investors (Cont’d) 
 
  Parent's investor reaction Subsidiary's investor reaction 
 P' announcement S' announcement own announcement P' announcement 
Time window [0;1] [2;60]  [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Top Two Quantiles 0.0138*** 0.0080 0.0022** 0.0084* 0.0167*** 0.0193*** 0.0002 0.0073 
 (7.5132) (1.5024) (2.0634) (1.7880) (8.6718) (2.9846) (0.1585) (1.2868) 
Same Day 0.0031 -0.0137 0.0005 0.0038 -0.0028 0.0068 -0.0009 0.0013 
 (0.8209) (-1.4302) (0.2553) (0.4739) (-0.8369) (0.542 ) (-0.2773) (0.1211) 
Sub First -0.0035 -0.0065 -0.0000 0.0089 0.0030 0.0203** -0.0017 -0.0039 
 (-1.1782) (-0.8048) (-0.0297) (1.3282) (1.2965) (2.4031) (-1.0414) (-0.5664) 
Same Fiscal Year 0.0041 -0.0143 0.0009 0.0116 -0.000  -0.0170 0.0041* 0.0126 
 (0.7979) (-1.2126) (0.4881) (1.3175) (-0.0014) (-1.2760) (1.8425) (1.2487) 
Market Value 0.0010 0.0105*** -0.0002 0.0108*** 0.016** 0.0178*** 0.0003 0.0157*** 
 (1.1764) (3.2346) (-0.2737) (4.2762) (2.3930) (5.0945) (0.3932) (4.7524) 
Q -0.0001 0.0142* 0.0030*** 0.0106** 0.0021 0.0195** 0.0014** 0.0137*** 
 (-0.0568) (1.9248) (3.7016) (2.4935) (1.5562) (2.2440) (2.0851) (3.3539) 
Is Illiquid -0.0009 -0.0407** -0.0029 -0.0757*** -0. 001 -0.0701*** -0.0070 -0.0388* 
 (-0.1971) (-2.4409) (-0.9119) (-3.1665) (-0.0173) (-4.0653) (-1.4735) (-1.6936) 
Nr. Analysts -0.0014 -0.0151*** -0.0010 -0.0218*** -0.0015 -0.0235*** -0.0008 -0.0185*** 
 (-1.1707) (-3.2447) (-1.1727) (-5.7156) (-1.1314) (-5.3164) (-0.7470) (-4.0895) 
Relative Market Value   0.0013 0.0026   0.0005 -0.0092** 
   (0.8828) (0.4830)   (0.6281) (-2.2364) 
% Common Analysts   0.0039 0.0662   -0.0092 0.0327 
   (0.4162) (1.6145)   (-0.9018) (0.7813) 
Has a Common Owner   -0.0010 0.0053   0.0003 0.0033 
   (-0.5949) (0.7564)   (0.1543) (0.3592) 
% Ownership   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 0.0001 
   (0.4865) (0.3183)   (0.2401) (0.7774) 
Directly Owned   -0.0007 -0.0123*   0.0036* -0.0114 
   (-0.4791) (-1.7232)   (1.9556) (-1.5653) 
Same Country   -0.0018 0.0083   -0.0001 0.0112 
   (-1.1988) (1.3121)   (-0.0422) (1.1820) 
Named After   0.0012 0.0075   -0.0037** -0.0068 
   (0.8617) (1.1483)   (-2.1318) (-0.7599) 
         
Observations 2,913 2,913 5,878 5,878 5,582 5,582 5,818 5,818 
R-squared 0.0315 0.1212 0.0125 0.1204 0.0307 0.1327 0.0171 0.1181 
Link Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 4.  Calendar Days Distance between Parent and Subsidiary Announcements 
The table reports the distribution of time distance (in calendar days) between a parent’s earnings announcement and its 
subsidiary’s in a given year. The sample is partitioned into (i) link-year observations where the parent and its subsidiary 
close their financial year on the same date and (ii) link-year observations where the parent and its subsidiaries do not. The 
samples are then further partitioned into these subsamples: (i) the parent and subsidiary make their earnings announcement 
on the same day, (ii) the subsidiary releases its earnings information first, and (iii) the parent releases its earnings first. 
  Nr. Obs. Mean Median P25 P75 Std. 
Parent and Subsidiary (with a Link) with the Same Financial Year   
   Same Day 1,964 0 0 0 0 0 
   Subsidiary First  5,873 12.9 7 2 15 17.9 
   Parent First 4,613 22.7 14 28 6 28.4 
Parent and Subsidiary (with a Link) with a different Financial Year    
   Same Day 4 0 0 0 0 0 
   Subsidiary First  1,346 100.3 85 50 127 69.6 
   Parent First 1,051 140.7 118 196 85 79.6 
  
 
Table 5. Parent and Subsidiary Announce on Same Day 
The table presents results from regressions of investor reactions to earnings announcements of earnings surprises 
(belonging to the top two quantiles of their distribution), for the cases where the parent and its subidiary close their 
financial year on the same day and earnings announcements take place on the same day. Columns (1-4) report parent’s 
investor reactions to the earnings announcements and columns (5-8) report subsidiary’s investor reactions to the earnings 
announcements. Specifications in the even-numbered columns report results with industry fixed-effects. Parent controls 
are the parent’s market value, the log of analyst coverage, the Tobin’s Q, and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s 
stock is illiquid. Subsidiary controls are the same as the parent’s control (but applied to the subsidiary). Date fixed effects 
consists of year, month, and day-of- the-week fixed effects. Robust t -statistics are reported between brackets. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Parent's Investor Reaction Subsidiary's Investor Reactions 
Time window BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Top Two Quantiles 0.0135*** 0.0149*** 0.0105 0.0065 0.0163*** 0.0141*** -0.0088 -0.0155 
 (2.9474) (3.0501) (0.6916) (0.4545) (3.6970) (3.5414) (-0.5508) (-1.2562) 
Market Value  0.0017  0.0138*  -0.0011  0.0236*** 
  (0.6359)  (1.6877)  (-0.4358)  (4.1229) 
Q  0.0032*  0.0028  0.0005  0.0111 
  (1.6935)  (0.3303)  (0.1140)  (0.7675) 
Is Illiquid  0.0077  -0.0058  0.0121  -0.0334 
  (0.9480)  (-0.1075)  (1.1360)  (-1.0447) 
Nr. Analysts  -0.0018  -0.0168*  0.0058  -0.0287*** 
  (-0.7016)  (-1.8503)  (1.6151)  (-3.0814) 
         
Observations 509 509 509 509 716 716 716 716 
R-squared 0.0719 0.0739 0.1122 0.1225 0.0546 0.0604 0.1400 0.1620 
Firm Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 




Table 6. Parent Announces First 
The table presents results from regressions of investors’ reactions to earnings announcements of earnings surprises 
(belonging to the top two quantiles of their distribution) for the cases where the parent’s and its sub idiary’s financial 
years coincide and the parent releases its earnings prior to the subsidiary. Panel A reports the parent investor reactions to 
the announcement by the parent (columns 1-4), and to the subsidiary’ announcement (columns 5-8). Panel B r ports the 
subsidiary investor reaction to the parent’s announcement (columns 1-4), and to the announcement of the subsidiary 
(columns 5-8). All specifications include year, month, and day-of-the-week fixed-effects. The even columns include firm 
controls and firm SIC-2 industry fixed effects for the models of investor reactions to their own company’s announcement. 
If models test investors’ reactions to the affiliated firm’s announcement, the models include link industry (parent-
subsidiary SIC-2) fixed effects, and link controls in addition to firm controls. Parent controls include the parent’s market 
value, the log of analyst coverage, market-to-book ratio, and a dummy variable equals one if the stock is illiquid. We 
include similar controls for the subsidiary. Link controls comprise relative market value, percentage of control held by 
the parent, percentage of common analysts, a direct ownership dummy, dummy variables equal to one if parent and 
subsidiary are located in the same country, if they share part of a corporate name, and if a common institutional investor 
own a stake in the parent and the subsidiary, respectively. Robust t-stats are reported between brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Parent’s Investor Reactions 
  
Parent Investor Reactions 
 Parent's announcement Subsidiary's announcement 
Time window BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top Two Quantiles 0.0096** 0.0079** -0.0065 -0.0149 0.0032** 0.0046** -0.0049 -0.0097 
 (2.3817) (2.3073) (-0.4825) (-1.0902) (2.1844) (2.371 ) (-0.7409) (-1.1692) 
Market Value  -0.0023  0.0077  -0.0029***  0.0087** 
  (-1.0492)  (1.2030)  (-2.9091)  (2.1379) 
Q  0.0013  0.0754***  0.0048***  0.0220*** 
  (0.3317)  (3.8671)  (3.9271)  (2.8229) 
Is Illiquid  -0.0085  -0.0321  -0.0010  -0.1172*** 
  (-1.0925)  (-0.8329)  (-0.1991)  (-5.2685) 
Nr. Analysts  -0.0009  -0.0012  0.0028*  -0.0142* 
  (-0.3323)  (-0.1338)  (1.7243)  (-1.9575) 
% Common Analysts      0.0138  0.1089* 
      (0.7779)  (1.7849) 
Relative Market Value      0.0007  0.0100 
      (0.2535)  (1.0175) 
% Ownership      0.0000  0.0001 
      (0.5545)  (0.4548) 
Has a Common Owner      0.0008  0.0069 
      (0.3362)  (0.6176) 
Directly Owned      0.0012  0.0013 
      (0.6742)  (0.1310) 
Same Country      -0.0011  -0.0125 
      (-0.5512)  (-1.0207) 
Named After      0.0017  -0.0113 
      (0.8326)  (-1.0605) 
Observations 748 748 748 748 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 
R-squared 0.0502 0.0533 0.1435 0.1800 0.0215 0.0349 0.1053 0.1385 
Firm Industry FE No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Link Industry FE No No No No No Yes No Yes 




Table 6. Parent Announces First (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Subsidiary’s Investor Reactions 
 
  
Subsidiary Investor Reactions 
 Parent's announcement Subsidiary's announcement 
Time window BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Top Two Quantiles 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0036 -0.0044 0.0148*** 0.0147*** 0.0305*** 0.0160 
 (0.0048) (-0.3883) (0.3625) (-0.4244) (4.2682) (4.9690) (3.0210) (1.4046) 
Market Value  0.0010  0.0214***  0.0013  0.0171*** 
  (0.4977)  (3.8763)  (0.6803)  (3.7117) 
Q  0.0016  0.0099  0.0034  0.0130* 
  (1.2480)  (1.4053)  (1.1916)  (1.7204) 
Is Illiquid  -0.0138*  -0.0512  -0.0046  -0.0662*** 
  (-1.9242)  (-1.5112)  (-0.9158)  (-2.7175) 
Nr. Analysts  -0.0018  -0.0142*  -0.0008  -0.0134** 
  (-0.8553)  (-1.9090)  (-0.3377)  (-2.0593) 
% Common Analysts  0.0070  0.0399     
  (0.3693)  (0.5946)     
Relative Market Value  0.0041  -0.0066     
  (1.2393)  (-0.5386)     
% Ownership  0.0001  0.0001     
  (0.9463)  (0.2292)     
Has a Common Owner  -0.0035  0.0119     
  (-1.0029)  (0.6318)     
Directly Owned  0.0024  -0.0051     
  (0.5445)  (-0.2915)     
Same Country  -0.0047  0.0288     
  (-1.2733)  (1.5228)     
Named After  -0.0068**  -0.0111     
  (-2.0603)  (-0.7691)     
         
Observations 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 
R-squared 0.0417 0.0522 0.1475 0.1872 0.0353 0.0376 0.1259 0.1462 
Link Controls No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Link Industry FE No Yes No Yes No No No No 





Table 7. Subsidiary Announces First 
The table presents results from regressions of investors’ reactions to earnings announcement of earnings surprises 
(belonging to the top two quantiles of their distribution), for the cases where parent and subsidiary close their financial 
year on the same date and where the subsidiary releases its earnings first. Panel A reports the parent company’s reactions 
to the subsidiary’s announcement (columns 1-4), and to the announcement of the parent which takes place after the 
subsidiary’s (columns 5-8). Panel B reports the subsidiary’s investor reactions to the subsidiary’s announcement (columns 
1-4), and to the parent’s announcement (columns 5-8). All specifications report results with year, month, and day-of-the-
week fixed-effects. The even-numbered columns include firm controls and firm SIC-2 industry fixed effects, if they 
concern investor’s reactions to their own company’s announcement. If models test investors reaction to the affiliated 
company’s announcement, models include link industry (parent-subsidiary SIC-2) fixed effects and parent-subsidiary 
controls in addition to firm controls. Parent contrls comprise the parent’s market value, log of analyst coverage, the 
Tobin’s Q, and an illiquidity dummy. We include similar controls for the subsidiary. Link controls comprise relative 
value, percentage of control held by the parent, percentage of common analysts, a directly ownership dummy, dummy 
variables equal to one if parent and subsidiary are located in the same country, share (part of) a corporate name, and if 
they share a common institutional owner, respectively. Robust t-stats are reported between brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Parent’s Investor Reactions  
  Parent's Investor Reactions  
 Subsidiary's announcement Parent's announcement 
Time window BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top Two Quantiles 0.0037** 0.0032* 0.0292*** 0.0278*** 0.0124*** 0.0106*** 0.0203** 0.0196* 
 (2.5551) (1.8337) (3.8552) (3.5360) (4.5370) (3.2325) (1.9883) (1.9305) 
Market Value  0.0001  0.0114***  0.0015*  0.0113*** 
  (0.1293)  (2.7642)  (1.8092)  (2.8550) 
Q  0.0020  0.0119  0.0014  0.0094 
  (1.5619)  (0.9496)  (0.5668)  (0.9027) 
Is Illiquid  -0.0096*  -0.0988***  -0.0045  -0.0650*** 
  (-1.8830)  (-3.6244)  (-0.8320)  (-3.1141) 
Nr. Analysts  -0.0027*  -0.0335***  -0.0010  -0.0195*** 
  (-1.8801)  (-6.1819)  (-0.5729)  (-3.6037) 
% Common Analysts  -0.0255***  -0.0659     
  (-2.6902)  (-0.9897)     
Relative Market Value  0.0012  0.0027     
  (0.7340)  (0.3148)     
% Ownership  0.0000  -0.0002     
  (0.7128)  (-0.7339)     
Has a Common Owner  -0.0032  0.0170     
  (-1.0481)  (1.4222)     
Directly Owned  -0.0022  -0.0241     
  (-0.7074)  (-1.5474)     
Same Country  -0.0038*  0.0379***     
  (-1.7902)  (2.6894)     
Named After  0.0021  0.0119     
  (0.8380)  (1.4685)     
Observations 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 1,236 1,236 1,236 1,236 
R-squared 0.0249 0.0422 0.1363 0.1786 0.0389 0.0371 0.1576 0.1770 
Link Controls No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Link Industry FE No Yes No Yes No No No No 




Table 7. Subsidiary Announces First (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Subsidiary’s Investor Reactions 
  Subsidiary's Investor Reactions 
 Subsidiary's announcement Parent's announcement 
Time window BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Top Two Quantiles 0.0212*** 0.0196*** 0.0301*** 0.0309*** 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0150* 0.0162 
 (7.8189) (6.2674) (3.2568) (2.9738) (0.3184) (-0.1323) (1.8922) (1.6446) 
Market Value  0.0026**  0.0130**  -0.0004  0.0142** 
  (2.3326)  (2.4874)  (-0.3571)  (2.4915) 
Q  0.0023  0.0249***  0.0012  0.0196*** 
  (0.8925)  (2.9691)  (0.8852)  (3.8718) 
Is Illiquid  -0.0011  -0.0578**  -0.0090  -0.0235 
  (-0.2274)  (-2.4199)  (-0.7403)  (-0.5637) 
Nr. Analysts  -0.0017  -0.0227***  0.0011  -0.0200*** 
  (-1.2190)  (-2.7390)  (0.8467)  (-2.6055) 
% Common Analysts      -0.0049  -0.0098 
      (-0.2278)  (-0.1380) 
Relative Market Value      -0.0004  -0.0098* 
      (-0.2613)  (-1.6787) 
% Ownership      -0.0000  0.0001 
      (-0.4884)  (0.3325) 
Has a Common Owner      -0.0007  0.0069 
      (-0.1984)  (0.4074) 
Directly Owned      0.0036  -0.0160 
      (1.1135)  (-1.1222) 
Same Country      0.0053  0.0192 
      (1.3991)  (1.3016) 
Named After      -0.0028  -0.0152 
      (-1.3613)  (-1.0308) 
         
Observations 2,125 2,125 2,125 2,125 2,541 2,541 2,541 2,541 
R-squared 0.0526 0.0525 0.1224 0.1494 0.0152 0.0183 0.1230 0.1419 
Link Controls No No No No No Yes No Yes 
Link Industry FE No No No No No Yes No Yes 





Table 8. Channels of Parent Investor Myopia 
The table presents results from regressions of parent investor reactions to subsidiary’s earnings annou cement, for the 
cases where parent and subsidiary close their financ al year on the same date and where the subsidiary releases its earnings 
first. Panel A reports immediate and delayed reactions to subsidiary’s announcement when the parent and subsidiary are 
located in the same country (columns 1-2) and when t y are located in different countries (columns 3-4). Panel B reports 
immediate and delayed reactions to subsidiary’s annou cement when the subsidiary is directly owned by the parent 
(columns 1-2) and when subsidiary is indirectly contr lled by the parent (columns 3-4). Panel C reports the parent reaction 
to subsidiary’s announcement when the parent and its subsidiary share part of a corporate name (columns 1-2), and when 
the parent and its subsidiary have or do not have an institutional outside investor in common (columns 3-4). Panel D 
reports the parent reaction to the subsidiary’s annou cement when the parent controls less (more) than 50% of the 
subsidiary (columns 1-2), and when the subsidiary’s relative market value is higher (lower) than the median of the relative 
market value distribution (columns 3-4). All specifications include year, month, day-of-the-week fixed-effects, link 
(parent-subsidiary SIC-2) fixed effects, parent companies, and link controls. Parent controls comprise the parent’s market 
value, log of analyst coverage, the Tobin’s Q, and  illiquidity dummy. Link controls include relative market value, 
percentage of control held by the parent, percentag of common analysts, a directly ownership dummy, dummy variables 
equal to one if parent and subsidiary are located in the same country, operate in the same SIC-2 industry, if they share 
part of a corporate name, and if they share a common institutional owner, respectively. Robust t-stats are reported between 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A Same Country Different Country 
 BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] 
          
Top Two Quantiles 0.0045** 0.0285*** 0.0012 0.0303* 
 (2.1071) (3.2147) (0.4171) (1.9108) 
          
Panel B Directly Owned Indirectly Owned 
  BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] 
     
Top Two Quantiles 0.0042** 0.0253*** 0.0032 0.0324** 
 (1.9937) (2.6614) (0.9161) (2.2234) 
     
Panel C Different Name Named After 
  BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] BHAR[0;1] BHAR[2;60] 
     
Top Two Quantiles 0.0029 0.0208** 0.0052 0.0306** 
 (1.4991) (2.0753) (1.4188) (2.2150) 
     
Panel D % Ownership Relative Size 
  <50% >50%  < Median > Median 
  BHAR[0;60] 
     
Top Two Quantiles 0.0265** 0.0343** 0.0188* 0.0337*** 
 (2.1429) (2.5236) (1.7739) (2.6387) 
          
Included in each above model:     
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 9.  Parent Investor Sophistication 
The table presents results from regressions of parent company investor reactions to subsidiary’s earnings announcement, 
for the cases where parent and subsidiary close their financial year on the same date and where the subsidiary releases 
earnings first. Columns (1-2) report the parent’s immediate and delayed reactions when at least one institutional investor 
owns a stake (of max, 10%) in the parent. Columns (3-4) report the parent’s immediate and delayed reactions when no 
institutional investor owns equity in the parent. Columns (5-6) report the parent’s total reaction to subsidiary’s 
announcement when the sum of stakes owned by institutional investors represent more than 5% and more than 10% of 
parent’s shares, respectively. Columns (5-6) report the parent’s share price reaction to its subsidiary’s announcement 
when the parent and subsidiary have a common institutional owner in a given year. All specifications report results with 
year, month, day-of-the-week fixed-effects, link (parent-subsidiary SIC-2) fixed effects, parent companies, and link 
controls. Parent controls comprise the parent’s market value, log of analyst coverage, the Tobin’s Q, and an illiquidity 
dummy. Link controls include relative market value, p rcentage of control held by the parent, percentag  of common 
analysts, a directly ownership dummy, dummy variables equal to one if parent and subsidiary are located in the same 
country, operate in the same SIC-2 industry, share (part of) a corporate name, and if they share a comm n institutional 
owner, respectively. Robust t-stats are reported between brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  Has an Institutional Owner 
% Institutional 
Ownership Has Common Owner 
 Yes No  >5% >10% Yes No 
 [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] [0;60] [0;60] [0;60] [0;60] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Top Two Quantiles 0.0044* 0.0350*** 0.0032 0.0226* 0.0271** 0.0326** 0.0344** 0.0287*** 
 (1.7837) (3.0001) (1.3046) (1.8459) (2.0763) (2.1814) (2.4987) (2.6601) 
         
Observations 1,234 1,234 995 995 1,057 911 954 1,275 
R-squared 0.0685 0.2452 0.0854 0.1906 0.2433 0.2650 0.2594 0.1829 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 10.   Strategic Announcement Timing and Investor Reactions 
The table tests the strategic disclosure hypothesis: The models in columns (1-4) report results of investor reactions to 
earnings announcements while endogenizing the parent’s a d subsidiary’s decision about when to announce (both 
announce on same day versus on different days). First stage specifications include dummy variables Surprise Both Top 
Two and Surprise Both Bottom Two, which are equal to one if both parent’s and subsidiary’s earnings surprises are in the 
top (bottom) two quantiles of their respective distributions, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (3) report the first stage 
results of parent’s and subsidiary’s announcement timing, respectively. The model in columns (5-7) estima es the parent’s 
investor immediate (column (6)) and longer-term (column (7)) reactions to the subsidiary’s announcement co ditional on 
the subsidiary announcing first (relative to the parent announcing first). The subsidiary’s investor reactions to parent 
announcements are not reported. First stage specifications include link industry fixed effects and time fixed effects. 
Second stage specifications include link industry fixed effects, year, month and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Note that 
link industry fixed effects in this table are based on the Bureau van Dijk 1-digit industry classificat on. Robust t-tats are 
between brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
P & S Announce on 
Same vs Different Day 
P & S Announce on Same 
vs Different S Announces First versus Last 
 P' Investors S' Investors 
P' Investor Reactions at S' 
Announcement 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 
Time window Same Day [0;1] Same Day [0;1] S. First [0;1] [2;60] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Top Two Quantiles  
0.0127**
*  0.0201***  0.0037** 0.0315*** 
  (4.6261)  (7.5355)  (2.5098) (4.2371) 
Market Value  0.0008  -0.0005  0.0004 0.0108*** 
  (0.6156)  (-0.3872)  (0.6144) (3.2023) 




  (-0.9249)  (-1.9063)  (-2.8437) (-5.4515) 
Nr. Analysts  0.0003  0.0032*  -0.0017 -0.0274*** 
  (0.1489)  (1.7020)  (-1.5610) (-5.1834) 
Relative Market Value 0.3842*** -0.0018 0.1998*** 0.0043* 0.2033*** 0.0023* 0.0035 
 (11.2342) (-0.8424) (6.2964) (1.7612) (6.6844) (1.6671) (0.5098) 
Has a Common Owner 0.0147 0.0015 -0.1209** 0.0012 -0.1244** 0.0021 0.0028 
 (0.1897) (0.3435) (-2.1057) (0.2740) (-2.2562) (0.8456) (0.2253) 
% Ownership 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0037*** 0.0000 0.0041*** 0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.2002) (-0.8194) (4.2812) (0.1771) (4.8500) (1.6151) (-1.0036) 
Directly Owned 0.0826 0.0018 0.1571*** 0.0067* 0.1488*** -0.0022 -0.0230** 
 (1.2910) (0.4771) (3.2990) (1.7978) (3.2148) (-1.0702) (-2.1858) 
Same Industry -0.0644 0.0030 -0.1927*** -0.0037 -0.1822*** -0.0038 -0.0184 
 (-0.7638) (0.6950) (-3.2091) (-0.8950) (-3.1240) (-1.6203) (-1.5720) 
Same Country 0.1880*** 0.0017 0.1446*** 0.0030 0.135 *** -0.0023 0.0473*** 
 (2.8386) (0.4131) (2.9499) (0.7593) (2.8482) (-1.0451) (4.2594) 
Named After 0.5168*** 0.0005 0.4027*** -0.0016 0.3790*** 0.0015 0.0149 
 (8.5714) (0.1385) (9.6158) (-0.4517) (9.2665) (0.7990) (1.5785) 
Surprise Both Top Two 0.7307***  0.7206***  0.7141***   
 (8.3590)  (11.9490)  (12.2602)   
Surprise Both Bottom Two 0.6436***  0.7743***  0.7854***   
 (7.1122)  (12.5876)  (13.2316)   
Observations 3,365 3,365 6,474 6,474 6,845 6,845 6,845 
Link Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year+Month+Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 11. Parent’s Subsidizing Behavior 
The table investigates possible effects of internal capital markets. The table presents results from regressions of parent 
company investor reactions to subsidiary’s earnings announcement, for the case where parent and subsidiary close their 
financial year on the same date and where the parent releases earnings first. Parent Neg. Earnings is equal to one if the 
parent announces negative earnings, and zero otherwise. Q is the subsidiary’s market-to-book ratio. dQ is the difference 
between subsidiary’s and parent’s market-to-book ratios. iQ is a dummy variable that takes the value one if dQ is strictly 
positive. Also included are company controls, year, month, day-of-the-week fixed effects, parent contrls (parent’s market 
value, log of analyst coverage, and an illiquidity variable), and link control variables (relative market value, percentage 
of control held by parent, percentage of common analysts, a direct ownership dummy, dummy variables equal to one if 
parent and subsidiary are located in the same country, if hey share part of a corporate name, and if they share a common 
institutional investors, respectively. Robust t-stat  re reported between brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Parent Investor Reactions to Subsidiary's Announcement 
Time window BHAR[0;1] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
S' Top Two Quantiles 0.0039** 0.0021 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0034 
 (2.1168) (1.2317) (0.6037) (0.7946) (-1.2951) 
P' Negative Earnings -0.0006 -0.0033 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0069** 
 (-0.2173) (-1.0990) (-0.7714) (-1.1880) (-1.9977) 
S' Top Two x P' Neg. Earnings  0.0106** 0.0146** 0.0115** 0.0224*** 
  (2.0139) (2.2300) (2.1468) (2.9279) 
Q (subsidiary)   0.0035*   
   (1.8327)   
S' Top Two x Q   0.0015   
   (0.8076)   
P' Negative Earnings x Q   -0.0008   
   (-0.3648)   
S' Top Two x P' Neg. Earnings x Q   -0.0062**   
   (-2.0004)   
dQ = S' Q - P' Q    -0.0026*  
    (-1.8469)  
S' Top Two x dQ    0.0062***  
    (3.8849)  
P' Neg. Earnings x dQ    0.0038**  
    (2.1961)  
S' Top Two x P'Neg. Earnings x dQ    -0.0096***  
    (-3.7271)  
iQ = i(S' Q > P' Q)     -0.0061** 
     (-2.1380) 
S' Top Two x iQ     0.0100*** 
     (3.1577) 
P' Negative Earnings x iQ     0.0069 
     (1.3644) 
S' Top Two x P'Neg. Earnings x iQ     -0.0236** 
     (-2.2942) 
Observations 1,969 1,969 1,966 1,966 1,969 
R-squared 0.0298 0.0327 0.0392 0.0375 0.0385 
Link Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 12.  Confounding Events: 
Parent Investor Reaction to Subsidiary's Announcements 
 
The table presents results from regressions of parent investor reactions to the subsidiary’s earnings announcements of 
earnings surprises (belonging to the top two quantiles of their distribution) for the case where the subsidiary releases its 
earnings information first. Observations with parent a d subsidiary closing their financial year at different dates are also 
included in this sample. Columns (1) reports parent’s i vestors delayed reaction to the subsidiary’s announcement over 
[+2;+60] trading days after the announcement. A contaminated window variable is included and takes the value one if the 
parent announces within a period of 60 trading days after the subsidiary’s announcement (over which the delayed reaction 
is calculated). Columns (2-5) report delayed parent investor reactions to the subsidiary’s announcement, calculated for 
different event windows prior to the parent’s annoucement - observations with parent’s announcements occurring within 
the event window are here excluded. All specifications include a dummy variable same financial year that is equal to one 
if parent and subsidiary close their financial year on the same date. The specifications include parent controls (market 
value, log of analyst coverage, Tobin’s Q, and an illiqu dity variable), time-varying link controls (relative market value, 
percentage of common analysts, and a dummy common institutional outside investor), link (parent-subsidiary) fixed 
effects and time (year, month, day-of-the-week) fixed effects. Robust t-stats are reported between brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Time window BHAR[2;60] BHAR[2;10] BHAR[2;20] BHAR[2;30] BHAR[2;40] 
            
Top Two Quantiles 0.0243*** 0.0104** 0.0173* 0.0308** 0.0309* 
 (2.8645) (2.2521) (1.8830) (2.1582) (1.8625) 
Contaminated Window 0.0026     
 (0.2287)     
Same Fiscal Year 0.1429 0.0431*** 0.0514 0.0018 -0.0384 
 (1.2292) (3.5009) (1.1068) (0.0417) (-0.3718) 
      
Observations 2,757 1,162 774 575 496 
R-squared 0.1553 0.0837 0.0904 0.1542 0.2002 
Number of pairid 1,117 549 369 261 215 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Link FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 13. Main Models with Country Fixed Effects 
 
The table presents results on investor reactions to earnings announcement of earnings surprises (belonging to the top two 
quantiles of their distribution), for the cases where parent and subsidiary close their financial year on the same date. Panel 
A reports report investors’ reactions when the parent announces first. Panel B reports report investors’ reactions when the 
subsidiary announces first. All specifications report results with year, month, day-of-the-week fixed-ffects, link (parent-
subsidiary) country fixed effects, parent controls, and link controls. Parent controls comprise the parent’s market value, 
log of analyst coverage, the Tobin’s Q, and an illiquidity dummy. Link controls include relative market value, percentage 
of control held by the parent, percentage of common analysts, a directly ownership dummy, dummy variables equal to 
one if parent and subsidiary operates in the same SIC-2 industry, share (part of) a corporate name, and if they share a 
common institutional investor respectively. Robust t- tats are reported between brackets. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectiv ly. 
 
Panel A: Parent Announces First 
  
Parent's Investors Subsidiary's Investors 
 P' Announcement  S' Announcement  P' Announcement  S' Announcement  
Time window [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Top Two Quantiles 0.0117** -0.0099 0.0023* -0.0075 0.0000 0.0001 0.0144** 0.0184* 
 (2.1137) (-1.4972) (1.7477) (-1.3329) (0.0056) (0.0114) (2.5099) (1.8752) 
         
Observations 926 926 2,370 2,370 1,669 1,669 1,878 1,878 
R-squared 0.0646 0.1561 0.0219 0.1080 0.0534 0.1766 0.0428 0.1451 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Country FE Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
Link Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Link Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year+Month+Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Subsidiary Announces First 
  Parent's Investors Subsidiary's Investors 
 S' Announcement  P' Announcement  S' Announcement  P' Announcement  
Time window [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] [0;1] [2;60] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Top Two Quantiles 0.0033* 0.0332*** 0.0126*** 0.0156 0.0199*** 0.0291*** 0.0000 0.0144** 
 (1.8012) (3.8888) (4.5823) (1.6321) (5.8042) (3.3393) (0.0018) (2.0553) 
         
Observations 2,229 2,229 1,236 1,236 2,125 2,125 2,541 2,541 
R-squared 0.0376 0.1645 0.0430 0.1822 0.0531 0.1470 0.0200 0.1477 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Link Controls Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
Link Country FE Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
Year+Month+Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
